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Abstract
Partisan gerrymandering, the process of drawing the district boundaries of election maps
unfairly for a given party’s political gain, is a practice that originated in the early 1800s and persists
today. As partisan gerrymandering cases have met varying degrees of success in state and federal
courts, now more than ever is there a need to define rigorous methods of assessing the partisan bias of
election maps. In practice, two primary mathematical tools are utilized to quantify gerrymandering:
measures of partisan bias and outlier analysis methods.
This thesis analyzes the 2011 and 2018 Congressional districting plans of Pennsylvania
and uses the results to inform an analysis of the 2011 South Carolina Congressional and state
legislative maps. The goals of this study are to (1) provide a state-specific analysis of South Carolina
and (2) contribute to the current body of literature by increasing transparency in gerrymandering
detection procedures, investigating how outlier analysis methods perform for gerrymandered versus
fair maps and how various partisan bias measures available perform compared to one another.
Results of this study indicate that, using the
√
ε test as defined by Chikina et al. in the 2017
case League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, relatively unbiased maps indicate
clear levels of non-significance compared to their biased counterparts. Certain measures of partisan
bias, such as median-mean and the geometric bias measure defined under a variable partisan swing
assumption, are also found to perform more consistently as indicators of gerrymandering than other
metrics. In addition, this study finds that there is insufficient evidence of partisan gerrymandering
in the Congressional, state Senate, and state House maps of South Carolina drawn during the 2011
redistricting cycle.
Keywords: election maps, gerrymandering, redistricting, partisan bias, outlier analysis, Markov
chains, statistics, Pennsylvania, South Carolina
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In March of 1812, the Boston Gazette featured an artist’s rendition of an unusual-looking
voting district in the northeastern corner of Massachusetts, accompanied by the caption “The Gerry-
mander: A new species of Monster, which appeared in Essex South District in January last” [18].
Then-governor of Massachusetts Elbridge Gerry had signed a bill authorizing the redrawing of the
voting districts in the state and, intent on securing representation in the state senate, members of
Gerry’s political party carefully drew district boundaries to include their constituents [39]. Snaking
around the outer edge of Essex county, the resulting district was said to resemble a salamander,
most likely referring to the mythological monster from classical folklore [30]. It was then that the
term gerrymandering was born, and within a year its usage had extended to include all instances of
drawing voting districts unfairly for political gain.
Despite being centuries old, gerrymandering is no less prevalent today than it was in the
nineteenth century. In recent years, the dialogue about gerrymandering has focused particularly on
partisan gerrymandering, in which district boundary lines are drawn to advantage one political party
over another, much like the Massachusetts district that drew so much attention in 1812. Like all
forms of gerrymandering, partisan gerrymandering is believed to undermine democracy and dilute
the power of the individual vote. It is thus worthwhile to answer the question of how unfair maps
can be quantified and use these standards to assess the maps in one’s own state.
While much work has been done on measures of partisan fairness, both in their development
and application, detailed analyses of election maps are not available for every state, and those that
do exist often consist of only one or two measures. Though this is a start, comparing a selection
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of multiple bias measures is beneficial to gain a more comprehensive understanding of an election
map, as bias measures are not necessarily standardized across settings. In addition, analyses for the
election map of a single state are often discussed in isolation, leaving limited information available
that explicitly compares fair maps to gerrymandered ones. This thesis contributes to the growing
body of literature by providing a thorough, comparative mathematical analysis of the Pennsylvania
Congressional maps from 20111 and 2018, which serve as examples of a gerrymandered map and a
fair map, respectively, using multiple partisan bias measures. These results are then used to inform
an analysis of several South Carolina election maps.
(a) A map of the 1812 Essex South District. (b) The cartoon mocking its bizarre shape.
Figure 1.1: The districting that coined the term gerrymandering as it appeared in the Boston
Gazette. Map reproductions courtesy of the Norman B. Leventhal Map & Education Center at the
Boston Public Library [47].
The goal of this paper is twofold: (1) to provide a state-specific analysis of South Carolina
election maps that does not exist elsewhere to evaluate whether there is significant evidence of par-
tisan bias, and (2) to increase transparency in how partisan fairness measures and other assessments
of election maps can be applied and understood within the context of detecting gerrymandering.
This thesis aims to increase transparency in gerrymandering detection procedures by exploring how
measures of partisan bias and outlier analysis methods perform across a variety of conditions, and
1The 2011 Congressional map for Pennsylvania refers to that which was drawn during the redistricting process
immediately following the 2010 Census.
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in doing so, answers the following questions:
 How do methods compare for gerrymandered maps versus fair maps?
 How do methods compare to one another on a given election map?
The first chapter of this work provides an introduction to the basic principles of redistricting
and describes the current state of partisan gerrymandering in the United States. Chapter 2 then
summarizes the current body of literature on mathematical approaches to detecting gerrymandered
election maps. A discussion of the data used in this analysis is presented in Chapter 3, and the
methods for and results of the analysis are detailed in Chapter 4. The concluding chapter contextu-
alizes the results of the study, discusses limitations and implications, and provides suggested areas
for future work.
1.1 Principles of Redistricting
Gerrymandering occurs during the process of redistricting, in which politicians draw voting
district boundaries for the election of federal senators and representatives according to the provisions
set forth in the United States Constitution [13]. While each state is allotted two senators, represen-
tatives are apportioned to states every ten years based on the population as accounted for in the
most recent U.S. Census [11, 12]. The number of U.S. Representatives was permanently fixed at 435
by the Reapportionment Act of 1929, leaving a set number of seats to fluctuate between states with
shifts in the country’s population [7]. Similarly, each state has its own number of representatives
and senators that serve in the state legislature. For both federal and state elections, each seat in a
given state is represented by a single voting district called a single-member district. The method of
drawing these districts varies from state to state; for example, six states utilize independent com-
missions that expressly limit direct participation in the redistricting process by elected officials [37].
However, in the majority of states, the state legislature is charged with redrawing district boundary
lines, a power granted by Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution, subject to the regulation of
Congress. It has been observed throughout history that state legislatures controlled by a majority
party are often likely to engage in gerrymandering when it suits their party’s interest, and thus the
primary focus of this paper is on the latter scenario in which the state legislature is in charge of the
redistricting process.
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State mapmakers must abide by several guidelines at the federal and state level when redis-
tricting. The Apportionment Act of 1842, the first of many pieces of apportionment legislation that
were subsequently enacted, requires geographic, single-member districts as opposed to the at-large
electoral regions that were used previous to the passing of the Act [1]. The landmark U.S. Supreme
Court case Baker v. Carr, in which the Court held that redistricting qualifies as a justiciable ques-
tion, opened the door for the Court to consider legal disputes over redistricting and paved the way
for new legislation regarding redistricting procedures [2]. The series of court cases following Baker
emphasized the legal principle of “one person, one vote,” which required that electoral districts be
apportioned according to population. In 1964, it was ruled in Wesberry v. Sanders that Congres-
sional districts must be nearly equal in population, and it shortly followed in Reynolds v. Sims that
state legislative districts must also possess this quality [8, 16]. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 also
had a significant impact on the redistricting process, providing racial protections by requiring that
voting districts must not unduly disadvantage minority voters [15].
Many states have established additional requirements regarding the shape, size, and nature
of voting districts, oftentimes explicitly stated in their state constitutions [58]. One such state
is South Carolina, whose most recent redistricting guidelines were released in 2011 by the South
Carolina House and Senate Judiciary Committees [26, 45]. In addition to reinforcing federally
mandated principles, several guidelines are presented that provide a relatively thorough summary
of requirements appearing in other states’ redistricting laws.
 Population. While Wesberry v. Sanders and Reynolds v. Sims mandate that districts have
approximately equal populations, South Carolina laws further go on to say that Congressional
districts must achieve strict equality whenever possible. For the population estimates from
the 2010 Census, this equates to an ideal district population of 660,766 people. Legislative
districts must also be drawn to achieve roughly equipopulous regions, but the constraints are
somewhat relaxed. The guidelines by the Senate Judiciary Committee require that Senate
district populations must be within a plus-or-minus 5% deviation from 100,551 persons for
any given district. The House Judiciary Committee guidelines, on the other hand, place a
stricter bound on this deviation, requiring that each House district should be drawn within
a ±2.5% deviation from 37,301 individuals.
 Contiguity. Both Congressional and legislative districts must be made up of contiguous ge-
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ographic areas. In other words, a single district may not be comprised of two disconnected
regions that do not share a boundary. Though not required by any federal law, all fifty states
require some form of contiguity in their redistricting guidelines [37, 58]. Both sets of South
Carolina guidelines allow for contiguity by water, but have differing precedents for how district
areas touching at a point are regarded. The Senate guidelines consider point-to-point conti-
guity acceptable in certain cases, while the House guidelines state that regions connected at a
single point are not considered contiguous.
 Compactness. Unless being adjusted to meet the aforementioned federal and state principles,
districts should be “compact in form.” Compactness is a somewhat intuitive notion that limits
how spread out and “bizarre” the boundary for a district is. In general, districts that are closer
in shape to a circle are considered to be more compact, while sprawling, twisting districts
like Elbridge Gerry’s salamander are not. Although the South Carolina House redistricting
guidelines explicitly state that compactness will not be judged by mathematical measures,
several such measures for compactness exist. One of the most widely used is the Polsby-Popper
metric, which compares the area of a district to the area of a circle with a circumference equal
to district’s perimeter [44]. In legal documentation, however, the notion of compactness may
be rather subjective and vaguely defined only in terms of whether or not a map’s districts look
strange.
 Communities of Interest. Whenever possible, districts should preserve known communities
of interest, which may be defined several ways. South Carolina defines such communities as
those with similar political beliefs, voting behavior, geographic location, and economic, social,
cultural, and historic influences. County boundaries, municipal boundaries, and precinct lines
are also considered. Though not every district follows precinct or county lines, efforts are
made to avoid cutting across such boundaries unless necessary to meet other redistricting
requirements, such as population equality or compliance with the Voting Rights Act.
 Incumbency Protection. South Carolina law allows mapmakers to make reasonable efforts to
ensure that incumbent legislators remain in their current districts and are not forced to run
against other incumbent members of the state. This consideration is expressly prohibited in
some states and is not without controversy.
The redistricting process relies on the assumption that state legislatures will draw district
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boundaries to create fair districts representative of their respective populations, and the associated
redistricting laws aim to keep state legislatures honest so as to not violate this assumption. However,
these laws still leave room for district boundaries to be manipulated in order to influence election
outcomes, which can undermine the democratic process and dilute the votes of constituents.
1.2 How Gerrymandering Occurs
The main idea behind gerrymandering is straightforward: if one can draw districts that
include certain constituents and exclude others, then one can increase the likelihood of obtaining
more seats in the state legislature or federal House of Representatives for a given party.
In practice, gerrymandering takes two primary forms. Consider a community of interest
that historically votes overwhelmingly for a particular party. The first tactic used to gerrymander,
cracking, occurs when districts are drawn that spread members of the community out between several
districts. Cracking dilutes constituents’ voting power across multiple districts and constructs the
map so the community’s political party does not comprise a majority in any of the districts of which
it is a member. The second tactic used in a gerrymander is packing, in which districts are drawn to
cluster communities of interest into a single district or just a few districts. While the community’s
political party may overwhelmingly win the district or districts into which they are packed, they
would win comparatively fewer seats overall than what might be considered their fair share.
Packing and cracking, used in conjunction with one another, sometimes result in violations
of the compactness principle, but with the advances of map-making technology, it is entirely possible
to draw districts that are in reality packed and cracked, but appear to be fairly reasonable shapes.
There can be more to a voting map than meets the eye.
1.3 Gerrymandering Today
For much of its history, gerrymandering has taken the form of racial gerrymandering in
an effort to dilute the voices of minority voters. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was an important
step in U.S. history in making redistricting a fairer process that creates election maps that are
appropriate representations of their constituents. One example of the impact of the Voting Rights
Act on redistricting is the provision in Section 5 that, until 2013, subjected certain jurisdictions
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to pass federal preclearance by the U.S Attorney General or Federal District Court for D.C. when
implementing changes that affect voting, including the redrawing of election maps. Section 4(b)
includes a “coverage formula” that outlines the criteria that trigger the preclearance provision in
Section 5; these criteria, which South Carolina meets, include states that have historically enacted
racially discriminatory voting requirements2. Preliminary research has estimated that preclearance
requirements have had a positive effect on increasing minority voting participation and Congressional
representation [17, 48].
Even with the provisions in the Voting Rights Act that still offer legal backing to contest
racially discriminatory political districts, a more difficult-to-detect form of gerrymandering may creep
into the map-making room. Increasingly, the focus of the legal landscape has shifted to partisan
gerrymandering, and several accusations of election maps being drawn to disadvantage a given
political party based on previous voting patterns have surfaced in state and federal courts. With
increasing partisan polarization in the last decade, it is perhaps of little surprise that both Republican
and Democratic legislatures have been accused of bringing partisan bias to the redistricting process
in an attempt to gain seats. For example, the Wisconsin legislature was accused of a Republican
gerrymander in Gill v. Whitford, while a case of Democratic gerrymandering arose in Maryland in
Benisek v. Lamone [3, 4].
For several years, the U.S. Supreme Court remained undecided on how to address cases
that presented claims of partisan gerrymandering and consistently redirected such cases back to
lower courts. One challenge facing the courts was the amount of abstractness that can quickly
arise in claims of partisan discrimination. This challenge began to prompt the question of how
one can objectively analyze whether the voters of a given party are unfairly disadvantaged by a
districting plan. When Pennsylvania brought claims of partisan gerrymandering to the courts for
the first time in the 2004 case Vieth v. Jubelirer, the case was struck down on the basis that there
is no Constitutional provision for courts to restrict election maps from being drawn with partisan
intent. Still, Justice Anthony Kennedy acknowledged that “comprehensive and neutral principles
for drawing electoral boundaries” did not yet exist, but these concrete principles could one day be
discovered [14].
2It is of note that while the coverage formula held for the redistricting process through 2013, it was struck down as
unconstitutional in the 5-4 case Supreme Court case Shelby County v. Holder, with the majority reasoning that the
criteria are outdated and thus violate the principles of equal state sovereignty and federalism. While the Court did
not strike down the preclearance requirement in Section 5, unless a new coverage formula is written, the provision in
Section 5 is unenforceable [10].
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This ruling was a source of hope for U.S. citizens involved in the fight against gerrymander-
ing, and as a result of Justice Kennedy’s statement, mathematicians, political scientists, and other
interested parties have set out to explore what such standards might look like. Though elusive at
first, several rigorous methods for evaluating the partisan bias of maps have since been developed,
taking into account both existing redistricting principles and political demographics of voters. Cases
in which these methods are utilized have often been stalled in the federal court, but some have met
success at the state level, resulting in the drawing of fairer election maps.
Arguably one of the most successful partisan gerrymandering lawsuits is the League of
Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania case (hereafter referred to as LWV
v. PA), which was introduced to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2017 and resolved the following
year. Due to the combined efforts of mathematician Wes Pegden from Carnegie Mellon, political
scientist Jowei Chen from University of Michigan, and political scientist Christopher Warshaw from
George Washington University, several rigorous methods based in mathematical theory (described in
Chapter 2) were utilized to demonstrate that the 2011 Pennsylvania Congressional map was drawn
with partisan intent, resulting in extreme partisan bias towards Republicans and thus diluting the
voting power of Democrats. The results of their analysis were so overwhelming, the plaintiffs argued,
that they could only be the result of carefully drawn districts and could not have occurred simply
due to the voter makeup of the state. The state court ruled in favor of the League of Women Voters,
holding that the districting plan violated Article I, Section 5 of the Pennsylvania State Constitution,
which requires that the state hold “free and fair elections.” As a result, the districting plan was
redrawn in time for the 2018 midterm elections [6].
In efforts to bring cases like LWV v. PA to the Federal Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy was
considered to be a swing vote who might help along such efforts if clear and identifiable standards
were produced. However, after the retirement of Judge Kennedy and the appointment of new
Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the political landscape of the court shifted. A combined
partisan gerrymandering case entitled Rucho v. Common Cause, which considered the claims made
by plaintiffs in North Carolina and Maryland of a Republican and a Democratic gerrymander,
respectively, was introduced in March 2019. Three months later, the Supreme Court released a 5-4
decision to remain uninvolved in partisan gerrymandering cases, stating that such claims present
political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts. Chief Justice John Roberts clarified that
the conclusion of the case neither “condone[d] excessive partisan gerrymandering” nor “condemn[ed]
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complaints about districting to echo into a void,” but rather that the majority felt there are other
methods of recourse available that are more appropriate than the intervention of federal courts [9].
Thus, partisan gerrymandering cases remain an issue for state supreme courts.
Fortunately, the fight to end partisan gerrymandering does not appear to be a lost cause.
The premise of free and fair elections found in the Pennsylvania state constitution is also echoed in
the constitutions of twenty-seven other states [57]. This could be used as a substantial argument
against the practice of partisan gerrymandering. In addition, bills that would establish independent
commissions to draw election maps every ten years have been proposed in many states; in the Rucho
court opinion, Chief Justice Roberts even mentions examples of such commissions as a reasonable
potential alternative to bring partisan gerrymandering claims to federal courts. Though not a
foolproof solution, the passing of such bills would take the redistricting process out of the hands of
legislators who may possess partisan intent and put it into the hands of a potentially more balanced
group of individuals committed to upholding fair democracy rather than furthering political gain.
Such commissions are already in place in six states, though their makeup varies [37]. In South
Carolina, bills were introduced in 2017 to both the House and Senate with bipartisan support to
form such a redistricting commission.
So despite the stepping back of the U.S. Supreme Court, hope still exists at the state level
for partisan gerrymandering cases. However, the question of how to rigorously determine whether a
map is biased towards a given political party and thus demonstrate a need for its redrawing remains.
1.4 Identifying a Gerrymander
While violating state and federal districting requirements is enough to give a reasonable
suspicion that a map may be gerrymandered, it turns out that identifying a gerrymander with
clear standards is a bit more complicated. For example, consider the principle of compactness.
One can look at an election map and quickly identify districts that appear to be unusual with
respect to the others, and the compactness of the districting plan can be measured using one of the
traditional metrics, such as Polsby-Popper. But just how “unusual” does a districting have to be
to be considered an extreme enough instance of gerrymandering by the state courts? In addition to
the already complicated task of finding a rigorous enough metric to assess partisan bias, sometimes
bias occurs naturally due to the political geography of a state. For example, Democratic voters tend
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to cluster in urban areas, diluting their voting power among more spread-out rural districts that
tend to vote Republican [40]. How can one discern whether the bias of a map is due to a malicious
manipulation of voting district boundaries or simply the natural bias that arises due to a state’s
voter makeup?
We thus turn to mathematics in such an endeavor. To evaluate whether an election map was
intentionally drawn with the purpose of diluting a party’s votes, one can consider looking at a large
sample of possible maps that could be drawn for a given state, taking into account voter preferences,
populations, county lines, and other factors. The map in question can then be compared against
the others to evaluate how extreme it is with respect to the sample, thus assessing the likelihood of
a gerrymander. This method has been utilized to evaluate several election maps in the last several
years, including the Congressional districting plan that was redrawn as a result of LWV v. PA, and
may be considered a reasonable way to approach the challenge of partisan gerrymandering.
In light of the aforementioned redistricting principles in Section 1.1, the next chapter
presents a review of the current body of literature on evaluating districting plans, summarizing
proposed measures of partisan bias and methods of outlier analysis that have been used in both
academic literature and legal cases in the United States. A selection of the measures and methods
discussed is then used in the following chapters to analyze the 2011 Congressional, State House, and
State Senate election maps of South Carolina3.
3As with the district maps drawn for Pennsylvania, the “2011 maps” for South Carolina refer collectively to the




As mathematicians and political scientists alike have set out in search of rigorous ways to
detect partisan gerrymanders, the body of literature regarding possible methods has grown sub-
stantially, particularly over the last twenty years. This chapter reviews multiple methods that have
been used to assess election maps for partisan bias in existing literature, summarizing their advan-
tages and disadvantages, conditions under which they break down, and their usefulness in detecting
gerrymandered maps as discussed by the academic community.
It is of note that, in the literature discussed, a two-party system of Democrats and Republi-
cans is assumed for simplicity. For most states, in which the proportion of votes cast for third-party
candidates is small, this is a reasonable assumption. It is often helpful in practice to define a refer-
ence party in the definition of a metric; in the literature reviewed, this has been observed to typically
be the party that is supposed to be disadvantaged by a suspected gerrymander. For purposes of
this paper, when it is helpful to utilize a reference party, we allow the Democratic party to serve
as this party of interest. For example, if discussing an average district vote share of 0.45, we are
describing a scenario in which Democratic candidates received an average of 45% of the votes cast
in each district. Also note that the variables used in this chapter may be adjusted from the original
works of literature in which they are defined for consistency throughout this document.
Katz et al. are credited for their significant work in bringing together much of the existing
literature on partisan fairness in their 2019 paper for American Political Science Review [33]. In
addition to drawing from other sources, the first section of this chapter emphasizes many pieces of
their work most closely related to the goals of this thesis.
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2.1 The Seats-Votes Curve
The first step in conducting a thorough analysis of an election map’s “fairness,” which is
often used as a rather arbitrary designation, is to formally define a standard by which fairness will
be evaluated. This leads to the identification of several metrics that adhere to this standard and
quantify the degree of partisan bias in a given map. This chapter begins with a discussion of a
theoretical graph that lies at the heart of many such bias metrics and a formal definition of what is
meant by partisan bias.
2.1.1 Definition
In Katz et al.’s evaluation of partisan fairness measures, they define a state to have the
following three underlying components [33]:
 A populace P, which represents the set of all individuals living in a state, as well as their voting
behavior;
 An electoral system E, which describes the system by which individuals in the populace have
their votes turned into seats and includes the district boundary lines that are of interest when
discussing an election map; and
 All measured exogeneous influences X on voter behavior, which includes factors such as demo-
graphic variables, geographic location, and whether or not there are incumbents in a particular
election.
For a state with L voting districts as defined by E, the random variables v1, . . . , vL represent the
district-level proportions of reference party votes in each district and follow a joint probability
distribution with density p(v1, . . . , vL|X). Recalling that the function of a random variable is itself
a random variable, v1, . . . , vL can be used to define two new random variables that represent two
quantities observed in any given statewide election: the statewide average district vote, formally
defined as







and the statewide seat proportion, stated as





1(vd > 0.5), (2.2)
where 1 is the indicator function. As Katz et al. point out, the electoral system E is crucial in the
understanding of these two random variables, as the effect of redistricting reflected in E dictates
how the boundary lines are drawn and can result in two sets of district-level votes that have the
same average district vote share V but different values of the seat share S.
These random variables provide the basis for the seats-votes function, denoted S(V ) and
defined as the expected value of the statewide seat proportion for a given statewide vote V :






S(v1, . . . , vL) · p(v1, . . . , vL|V,X)dv1 · · · dvL. (2.3)
In order for this function to be coherent and single-valued, an assumption that Katz et al. refer to as
the Stable Electoral System Assumption is made. This assumptions states that the joint probability
density p is defined independently of any one set of observed district vote proportions vO1 , . . . , v
O
L
that occur in a given election, which allows the seats-votes curve to then be defined as the set of all
possible values of S(V ) for the given P, E, and X, denoted
S = {S(V ) : V ∈ [0, 1]} . (2.4)
2.1.2 Partisan Symmetry and Bias
The seats-votes relationship gives rise to the notion of partisan symmetry, which King and
Browning characterize as an absence of partisan bias [35]. Katz et al. formally define partisan
symmetry in terms of the seats-votes curve, achieved if an electoral system E satisfies
S(V ) = 1− S(1− V ) for all V ∈ [0, 1] . (2.5)
The intuition behind the partisan symmetry standard is that neither party should have an advantage
over the other when it comes to turning votes into seats. In other words, in a symmetric electoral
system, we would expect an average district vote of V to win a proportion of S seats, regardless of
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which party achieved the average district vote of V . Partisan symmetry reasonably formalizes the
idea of partisan “fairness,” which Nagle states should be “a primary outcome of redistricting” [41].
McDonald and Best emphasize that symmetry serves as a good “reality-based benchmark,” as it does
not require one to choose between competing political ideologies to determine what is considered
fair [40]. Even where not explicitly stated, these sentiments are echoed by many authors in the
literature regarding the evaluation of election maps, and thus partisan symmetry is assumed as the
standard by which to evaluate the fairness of a given map in this paper.
When partisan bias is present, asymmetry is introduced into the seats-votes relationship [35].
In general, this bias can be viewed as a deviation from partisan symmetry [29]. Katz et al. can again
be credited with formally defining partisan bias in terms of the seats-votes curve as a random variable
that captures the deviation from partisan symmetry, stated as
β(V ) =
S(V )− [1− S(1− V )]
2
. (2.6)
Values of this random variable can be thought of as the distance from each party to symmetry, given
a certain statewide average district vote V . In practice, β(V ) represents the proportion of seats that
would have to be taken away from the reference party and given to the opposing party for the system
to be symmetric with respect to partisanship, with positive values of β(V ) indicating an advantage
for Democrats and negative values of β(V ) indicating an advantage for Republicans. For example,
if the bias of a particular map with a statewide average district vote of V = 0.48 is β(0.48) = −0.12,
this indicates that 12% of the seats in the legislature would need to be shifted from Republicans to
Democrats in order to achieve partisan symmetry.
Partisan bias is sometimes summarized at a point; for instance, we could summarize the
bias of a map when each party receives an average of 50% of the votes in each district, β(0.5). This
summary is only useful, however, if it represents the map’s bias for all empirically likely values of
V . If this is not the case, a summary measure could lead one to believe that an election map is fair
when it is actually biased at another point that could occur in a real election. In other words, even
if β(0.5) = 0, it does not imply that the districting plan is unbiased for all reasonable statewide
vote proportions; it could be biased at β(0.45), for instance, where V = 0.45 is a statewide vote
proportion that could possibly occur under the given plan. It may be desirable, then, to estimate
the bias random variable β(V ) at all possible values of V using the seats-votes curve.
14
2.1.3 Estimating the Seats-Votes Curve
The seats-votes curve is purely theoretical at this point, given that the joint density of
v1, ..., vL is unknown and quite challenging to estimate. Only a small sample of election results may
be observed under a given electoral system; for example, only five Congressional races occur under
a particular districting before the next census is taken and the maps are redrawn. As a result,
the joint distribution of district vote proportions is not easily observed through voting data, so the
seats-votes curve must be estimated using other methods.
Method 1: Functional Forms.
One method of estimating the seats-votes curve is to specify a class of parametric functional
forms that model the seats-votes relationship and estimate the parameters of a chosen form using
observed election data. For example, Tufte expounds on both a linear model, used as early as the
1950s by Robert Dahl, and a more statistically “graceful” logit model [52]. Each functional form
includes parameters related to two distinct features of an electoral system: (1) its partisan bias and
(2) its degree of electoral responsiveness, also referred to as competitiveness in several texts, which
captures how quickly a party’s proportion of seats S(V ) changes with shifts in the statewide vote
V . King and Browning credit Tufte as probably the first to include bias and competitiveness in one
equation but as independent parameters, a strength also cited by Nagle [35, 41].
Another functional form introduced by King and Browning that has been increasingly used
by scholars such as Nagle is the bilogit model [35]. Stated in terms of the seats-votes curve, this










where λ is the bias parameter and ρ is the competitiveness or responsiveness parameter. Though not
identical, the bias parameter can be interpreted in a similar manner to β(V ) defined in Equation 2.6,
with λ < 0 representing a Republican advantage, λ > 0 representing a Democratic advantage, and
λ = 0 corresponding to an unbiased system1. The competitiveness parameter, on the other hand,
1The variable λ used for the partisan bias parameter in this thesis corresponds with King’s usage. In his 1989
paper, he defines λ in this manner, noting its equivalence to ln(β) used in his 1987 paper with Browning, where β
is a quantity unrelated to the partisan bias random variable β(V ) presented in Equation 2.6 [34, 35]. This λ is also
equivalent to α0 used by Katz et al. [33]. Note that Nagle defines λ in the opposite manner, with positive values











changes with the type of democratic representation that exists in an electoral system. An electoral
system with perfect proportional representation would have a competitiveness parameter of ρ = 1;
however, this is typically infeasible in a district-based electoral system, a fact that was cited in
Rucho v. Common Cause [9]. A more reasonable range of plausible values consistent with what has
been observed empirically in U.S. elections would be 1 < ρ < ∞, which represents a majoritarian
electoral system [33, 34]. For example, the bilogit model may use a parameter value of ρ = 3 to
correspond with the cube law referenced by Tufte [52].
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Bilogit Seats-Votes Curve 
 Majoritarian Representation ( =3)
No Bias ( =0)
Democratic Advantage ( =1)
Republican Advantage ( =-1)
(b) Majoritarian Representation
Figure 2.1: Two examples of theoretical seats-votes curves drawn according to the bilogit model.
In practice, the parameters λ and ρ can be estimated using data from an observed election
outcome either by performing a direct fit to the data or by using the max-likelihood method of
estimation [41]. King and Browning argue that, not only does the bilogit model hold advantages
over the linear model in that it can model extreme values of V and S(V ), but it also is more realistic
than the logit model presented in Tufte’s work, allowing for the range of all possible degrees of
partisan bias and forms of democratic representation [35].
A major limitation of using functional forms to estimate the seats-votes curve is the fact
that the parameters must be estimated with very few available observations. In the case of Congres-
sional and state legislative districts, the maximum amount of available data would be five elections
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occurring under the same districting plan, and this small sample results in a rather uncertain model.
In addition, if the purpose of evaluating the bias of a map is to investigate whether it ought to be
redrawn to be fair for future elections, waiting until five elections have occurred under the redis-
tricting plan is an impractical solution. For this reason, Katz et al. view these functional forms as
more appropriate for studying broad patterns in electoral systems than for the practical evaluation
of individual electoral maps. This method does, however, provide a way of visually understanding
the theoretical seats-votes curve and how it changes based on the bias and competitiveness of a given
districting.
Method 2: Uniform Partisan Swing Assumption.
Because the election data available for a given districting plan is so limited, additional
assumptions must be in place to estimate the seats-votes curve if not using functional forms. One
such assumption is that of uniform partisan swing between elections. Katz et al. note that when
shifts in the average district vote proportion V occur, they are typically observed in two ways: as
an absolute average partisan swing affecting almost all districts in a state, which can be volatile and
difficult to predict, and as the relative positions of district votes for a particular election, which tend
to be highly stable over time and are valuable for evaluating districting plans. The assumption is
formally stated as follows:
Uniform Partisan Swing Assumption. When the average district vote swings between elec-
tions under the same electoral system E from V to V ′, every district vote proportion moves uniformly
by δ = V ′−V , so that {v1, . . . , vL} from one election becomes {v1 + δ, . . . , vL + δ} in the next, with
elements truncated to [0, 1] if necessary. [33]
This approach allows one to estimate the seats-votes curve using a single observed election
under a given electoral system (i.e., a particular redistricting plan), along with its average district
vote proportion V O = V (vO1 , . . . , v
O








1(vOd > 0.5). (2.8)
Fixed values of partisan swing δ can then be chosen to estimate the new statewide district vote and
seat proportions for hypothetical elections under the same electoral system. A useful application of
this assumption would be to choose multiple values for δ in order to estimate several points along the
seats-votes curve. In practice, the swing values can each be chosen to be the partisan shift needed
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for a single seat to switch from one party to another. The algorithm for constructing the estimated
curve in this manner can be summarized as follows:
1. Observe an election outcome
{




with statewide average district vote V O and esti-
mated statewide seat proportion Ŝ(V O). Plot
(
V O, Ŝ(V O)
)
on the curve.
2. For each vOi , i = 1, . . . , L:
(a) Choose the minimum swing δi such that seat i switches parties
2.
 If vOi < 0.5 (Republican seat), choose the minimum δi such that v
O
i + δi > 0.5.
 If vOi > 0.5 (Democrat seat), choose the minimum δi such that v
O
i + δi < 0.5.
(b) Apply the partisan swing δi uniformly to each district to obtain the new district vote
proportions {u1, . . . , uL}, where for d = 1, . . . L,
ud =

0 if vOd + δi < 0,
1 if vOd + δi > 1, and
vOd + δi otherwise.












(e) Plot the point
(




on the estimated seats-votes curve.
The idea of a uniform partisan swing occurring in a state can be traced back to Butler in his
analysis of the British General Election of 1950 [19]. Although variations in partisan shift between
the elections of 1945 and 1950 did occur in some areas of the country, the partisan swing was rather
consistent across regions overall. Butler attributed some of the variations to uncontested candidates
in certain regions and others to the effect of votes cast for third-party candidates. However, he
observed very few instances of deviations from the national average.
2In this theoretical context, exact ties are not considered; in existing literature, this assumption is either implied
or stated explicitly, as it is it Katz et al. where the authors assume that each district has an odd number of voters [33].
Indeed, exact ties in district-level elections are certainly rare events, yet they are still plausible and must be considered
when dealing with actual election data. An explanation of how ties are handled in this analysis is included in
Subsection 4.2.1.
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The reasonableness of the uniform partisan swing approach to estimating the seats-votes
curve is furthered by Katz et al., who conducted a study on the empirical accuracy of predictions
from the seats-votes curve under the uniform partisan swing assumption. A criticism offered by
Nagle is that the assumption is unrealistic, as it assumes, for instance, that the same number
of Democrats will shift in a district with few Democratic voters as will in a district with many
Democratic voters, echoing King’s supposition that the curve estimated this way is most sensible
in the competitive region near V = 0.5 but less so for extreme outcomes [34, 41]. Nagle and King
also emphasize that the assumption allows for scenarios in which one or more estimated district-
level vote proportions could fall below 0 or above 1, though Katz et al. handle this in their formal
statement of the assumption by simply truncating such values to be within the bounds. However,
the study conducted by Katz et al. using a large sample of pairs of successive elections under the
same districting plan would suggest that these criticisms need not necessarily be a concern. Upon
analyzing the out-of-sample error rate for the statewide seat proportion estimates, they found that
the predictions afforded by this estimated seats-votes curve were remarkably accurate and did not
seem to break down for larger swings, implying that uniform partisan swing is relatively fixed for
elections [33].
Another limitation of the uniform partisan swing assumption as stated by multiple authors
is that the model is deterministic rather than stochastic, which would be more reasonable when
working with real election data [33, 34]. Gelman and King propose such a model that they suggest
provides “substantially improved . . . estimates” for the seats-votes relationship in a two-party elec-
toral system [29]. The uniform partisan swing model, however, is a reasonable first approximation.
Method 3: Variable Partisan Swing Assumption.
As an alternative to the uniform partisan swing assumption, Nagle suggests another rea-
sonable method of approximating the seats-votes curve which we designate the variable partisan
swing assumption. Rather than supposing that a statewide partisan shift equally affects all districts,
this approach assumes that this shift has an equal probability of applying to any individual voter
in any district, allowing for the degree of partisan swing to vary for each district [41]. Under this
assumption, Nagle shows that we can expect a seat for district d currently won with a proportion
of vd votes to be lost if the average district vote decreases to
V
2vd
. This leads to the algorithm for
estimating points along this alternate seats-votes curve, which can be summarized as follows:
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1. Observe an election outcome
{




with a statewide average district vote V O.
2. For each vOd , d = 1, . . . , L, find the new statewide average district vote V
′
d that will cause that
seat to be lost3 to the opposite party:












3. Sort the L+1 statewide average district vote proportions
{




in order from least
to greatest.





on the estimated seats-votes curve.
It is of note that constructing the estimated seats-votes curve under the variable partisan swing
assumption results in a curve that is very similar to that under the uniform partisan swing assumption
in the 0.4 < V < 0.6 region, but typically deviates in the tails of the curve. Further, the seats-
votes curve estimated under this assumption does not have the issue of theoretical values of V
falling outside the [0,1] range and does not rely on truncation. While slightly different in their
implementation, both this assumption and the uniform partisan swing assumption provide valid
approaches to the challenge of assessing fair maps, and considering seats-votes curves constructed
under both assumptions adds to the rigor of this analysis.
The seats-votes curve lies at the heart of many partisan bias measures, as it provides a way
of both defining and visualizing partisan symmetry, which we can equate with our intuitive notion
of the “fairness” of an election map. Having an understanding of this curve and multiple methods
of estimating it using election data lays the groundwork for calculating measures of partisan bias.
Thus, the selection of bias measures used in the Chapter 4 analysis are considered under estimated
seats-votes curves using both Methods 2 and 3.
3Again, note that ties are not considered in this algorithm. Rather, the assumptions described by Nagle suppose
that a seat d held by Democrats would be lost to Republicans if the vote proportion in that district falls to vOd = 0.5,
which implies an odd number of voters. Subsection 4.2.1 describes how ties may be handled in practice.
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2.2 Measures of Partisan Bias
To analyze an election map, it is essential to have some way of measuring its degree of
partisan bias (i.e., its degree of partisan asymmetry) through a robust and comprehensible metric.
Throughout the literature available on the topic, several measures appear quite often and are widely
accepted by scholars as reasonable approaches — some of which have been utilized for over a century
— while others have been more recently proposed and lack widespread usage. Most approaches to
assessing the likelihood of gerrymandering do have one thing in common: they almost always use
more than one metric to assess the bias of a map. Referring to this tendency to conduct districting
plan analyses using a variety of metrics, Nagle comments that while a single superior measure
would be convenient, “complex social problems often do not yield to simple solutions” and that a
comparative practice of evaluating a map using several bias measures is rigorous and consistent with
approaches used to evaluate other features of election maps, such as compactness [41].
Again, for purposes of this thesis, partisan symmetry is used as the standard for the fairness
of an election map. That being said, any reasonable measure of partisan bias indicating some degree
of unfairness should correspond with nonzero values of the bias random variable β(V ), representing
a deviation from the ideal symmetry we wish to see in the seats-votes relationship for a fair election
system. Several such methods are discussed in this section, some of which use the estimated seats-
votes curve directly, and some which use only values from an observed election. Measures that
are commonly used to assess election maps but are not indicators of asymmetry are also briefly
discussed.
2.2.1 Bias Summary from the Seats-Votes Curve
The advantage of estimating the entire seats-votes curve by utilizing one of the methods
described in Subsection 2.1.3 is that it allows us to easily obtain a point estimate of β(V ) for any








by simply reading the values of Ŝ(V ) and Ŝ(1−V ) off the constructed curve. The seats-votes curve
allows us to observe how this deviation from partisan symmetry changes with shifts in V , which is
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notable because the direction of partisan bias can switch between parties for different average district
vote proportions [33]. This is a more robust approach than utilizing a single summary measure of
βˆ(V ) at a particular V , helping mitigate the potential problem of judging a map to be fair based
solely on the summary as presented in Subsection 2.1.2. However, summary measures may still be
used as an initial indicator of bias; for example, it may be of interest to summarize the bias of a
particular election map at the observed statewide average district vote using the bias point estimate
βˆ(V O). Zero values may not tell the whole story, but nonzero values can be clear indicators of bias
for observed election outcomes.
One limitation of using this measure is that, for moderate values of βˆ(V ) that are closer to
zero, the bias point estimate may be more meaningful for states with larger numbers of districts.
Recall that it represents the (possibly negative) proportion of seats that would have to be taken
from the reference party and given to the opposition party for the system to be symmetric. If we
consider a map with an observed statewide average vote of 0.48, a bias point estimate value of
βˆ(0.48) = −0.12 will hold stronger implications for an election map with 18 districts as opposed to
a map with five. In the former, this measure of βˆ(V ) indicates that 0.12(18) = 2.16 ≈ 2 seats would
have been won by Democrats in a symmetric election, while in the latter, the measure indicates that
0.12(5) = 0.6 seats would have been won by Democrats, which does not represent an entire seat. In
this regard, the election map with five districts might be judged to be relatively fair, while the one
with more districts might be considered biased. Still, keeping its limitations in mind, the bias point
estimate can provide a good initial metric to characterize the fairness of an election map.
2.2.2 Median-Mean
The median-mean metric (also called symmetry vote bias by McDonald and Best) is a metric
with origins traced as early as the nineteenth century and with applications to gerrymandering found
as early as the mid 1950s [19, 25, 40]. It is a straightforward, vote-denominated calculation of bias
found by subtracting the observed average district vote proportion V O from the median district vote
share M :
MM = M − V O. (2.10)
The median-mean metric characterizes the fairness of an election map by summarizing the skewness
of the district vote distribution, with nonzero values corresponding to some degree of asymmetry
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in the seats-votes relationship. When the Democratic party is the reference party, positive values
of MM represent an advantage for Democrats and negative quantities represent an advantage for
Republicans. Chikina et al. provide an intuition as to the interpretation of the metric: if the median
M = 0.5, this means that Democrats are winning half the seats, and if the mean V O is much smaller
than the median (thus making MM > 0), it means they are winning half the seats despite having a
small minority of the total votes [22].
The median-mean measure is a popular metric for assessing districting bias due to its com-
putational simplicity and easy-to-understand interpretation, described by McDonald and Best as
a “manageable standard” and “leading indicator of potential unfairness” [40]. Its usefulness also
stems from the fact that it is computed using two observable quantities from the election map
rather than quantities obtained from an estimated seats-votes curve, a criticism appropriately made
by Stephanopoulos and McGhee [50]. Katz et al. prove that MM is indeed a reliable measure of
partisan symmetry in light of the theoretical seats-votes curve, demonstrating that MM = 0 if and
only if βˆ(0.5) = 0, where βˆ(0.5) is the bias point estimate at V = 0.5 from the estimated seats-votes
curve [33]. The limitation of median-mean, however, is that it is a useful indicator for whether the
true bias summary at V = 0.5 is zero, but not a general measure of partisan bias for the entire
electoral system. Recall that a summary bias measure of zero does not imply that the map is fair for
all V ; thus, a median-mean value of zero could overlook bias occurring at another statewide average
district vote that may be observed in a real election under the given districting plan.
Despite its limitations, median-mean is a useful measure of bias; although zero values do
not necessarily imply that a map is truly unbiased, nonzero values point to asymmetry. The metric
has been used in several analyses of districting plans, including that of the 2011 Pennsylvania
Congressional Map made by Chikina et al. and presented by Pegden in LWV v. PA [22, 43].
2.2.3 A Geometric Measure of Bias
Nagle offers an alternative approach to quantifying partisan bias utilizing a measure that
he denotes BG, referred to in this paper as geometric partisan bias. While an intuitive definition of
partisan symmetry is established in Subsection 2.1.2 — namely, if one party receives a proportion of
seats S(V ) with an average district vote proportion of V , then so should the opposite party — Nagle’s
approach relates this to graphical symmetry. In a symmetric seats-votes curve, if a point exists on
its graph at (0.5 + x, 0.5 + y), then there should be another point on the curve at (0.5− x, 0.5− y),
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a quality referred to as inversion symmetry about the (0.5, 0.5) midpoint of the seats-votes graphical
space [41]. A calculation of geometric partisan bias is found by inverting the estimated seats-votes
curve about this midpoint and then finding the area in between the original curve and the inverted
one. The algorithm can be summarized in a few steps:
1. Graph the estimated seats-votes curve Ŝ(V ) using a selected method4 from Subsection 2.1.3.





curve to a point
(
1− V, 1− Ŝ(V )
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on the new curve.




∣∣∣Ŝ(v)− Ŝ−1(v)∣∣∣ dv. (2.11)
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Geometric Partisan Bias under the Bilogit Model 




Figure 2.2: An example demonstrating the geometric measure of partisan bias BG for a seats-votes
curve estimated using the bilogit functional form.
4In Nagle’s original development of geometric bias measure, he computes it using the seats-votes curve drawn
under the variable partisan swing assumption.
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Because the domain and range of both the estimated seats-votes curve and its inverse rep-
resent proportions and are thus always between 0 and 1, this geometric bias measure can be used to
compare the election maps for states with different numbers of seats5. An additional strength of this
measure is that it can reasonably include the tails of the seats-votes curves, where noncompetitive
and packed districts that may be undetected by the median-mean metric may be present [41].
Note that, unlike the bias point estimate and median-mean measures, the direction of the
bias in an electoral system cannot be determined by the sign of the geometric bias measure, which
is always positive. To determine the direction of the bias, one must compare the value of Ŝ(0.5)
from the estimated seats-votes curve to the midpoint of the graph; if Ŝ(0.5) < 0.5, BG captures a
Republican advantage, and if Ŝ(0.5) > 0.5, BG represents a Democratic advantage.
2.2.4 Measures That Do Not Capture Partisan Symmetry
The metrics discussed in this literature review are hardly the only ones that have been
used to measure partisan bias in the literature surrounding the mathematical detection of partisan
gerrymandering. However, when characterizing the absence of bias using the partisan symmetry
standard for fairness, the discussed measures can accurately quantify deviation from this symmetry
in ways that others fall short.
For example, consider the efficiency gap introduced by Stephanopoulos and McGhee, which
is sometimes used to assess districting plans and is occasionally confused for a measure of partisan
symmetry [50]. In this context, wasted votes are defined as the sum of (1) the number of votes ` cast
for a losing candidate and (2) the number of votes w cast for a winning candidate above the threshold
of 50% plus one vote. The efficiency gap EG then calculates the disparity in how “efficient” each
party’s votes are in electing candidates of their choice by finding the difference between the losing
and winning parties’ wasted votes and dividing by the total number of votes, which we denote to be
N . In other words, if Party A is the losing party and Party B is the winning party, then
EG =
(`A + wA)− (`B + wB)
N
. (2.12)
5The seats-votes graphs constructed by Nagle show the number of seats on the vertical axis rather than the
proportion of seats. In order to compare BG for state maps with different numbers of districts using his graphs, one
must divide his geometric bias measure by the number of seats. The estimated proportion of seats Ŝ(V ) is used here
both for consistency and for more readily comparable measures without this additional step.
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When EG > 0, the measure indicates that Party A wasted more votes than Party B and
thus the electoral system is in favor of the latter. In a “fair system,” one would expect this gap to be
small, implying that wasted votes are equally divided between the two parties. Like median-mean,
the efficiency gap is valuable because it is based solely on observed election outcomes and does not
require estimates from the theoretical seats-votes curve. It also conveys an interesting aspect of an
electoral system and can be helpful in assessing the likelihood of gerrymandering, as a districting
plan that intentionally packs and cracks its voters often results in a large number of wasted votes
for the disadvantaged party in comparison to the party advantaged by the gerrymander. However,
Stephanopolous and McGhee themselves specify that the efficiency gap is a quite different metric
than partisan bias, and Katz et al. demonstrate that it fails as a measure of partisan symmetry
because it does not correspond to a single-valued seats-votes function. Katz et al. can be credited
with identifying several such measures that do indeed quantify various aspects of an electoral system
but do not reflect partisan symmetry, including declination and lopsided outcomes [33]. While worthy
of further study, they do not pertain to the primary objective of this paper.
Another metric that has been used to assess partisan bias, albeit sometimes informally, is
the deviation from proportional representation,
PRD(V O) = Ŝ(V O)− V O. (2.13)
This measure follows the intuitive idea that a party that secures P% of the statewide votes should
receive roughly P% of the seats. The idea is often reflected in gerrymandering claims that view a
map as more suspect the further away from proportional representation its election outcomes lie.
The topic of proportional representation has been of some discussion in the political arena, most
recently surfacing in the court case Rucho v. Common Cause. The court produced the opinion
that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not grant a Constitutional
right to proportional representation [9]. Despite any controversy on the court opinion, it is worth
noting that this measure is not quite as rigorous as the other bias measures in identifying partisan
unfairness. Nagle posits that deviation from proportional representation is a strong diagnostic
when the proportion of votes won is greater than 0.5 but the proportion of seats won is less than
0.5; however, if the proportions of votes and seats won are both less than 0.5, the measure is
insufficient [41]. In addition, King states that proportional representation may not even be the ideal
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for an electoral system, as it does not allow for higher levels of competitiveness between districts [34].
While it is easy to understand, Katz et al. demonstrate that it also fails as a general measure of
partisan symmetry [33]. This measure produces a coherent seats-votes curve and is a special case of
partisan symmetry when PRD(V O) = 0; however, nonzero values of PRD(V O) can still occur even
when the partisan bias measure β(V ) = 0. It is thus an insufficient measure of partisan symmetry,
which is used as the standard for fairness throughout this thesis.
2.2.5 A Note on Measures of Competitiveness
Another aspect of election maps discussed throughout the literature is the idea of com-
petitiveness. Scholars have not reached a consensus on whether more or less competitiveness is
preferable in an attempt to achieve partisan fairness across election districts; however, it is impor-
tant to recognize that competitiveness, which also characterized as responsiveness or representation
such as in the parameter ρ defined in Subsection 2.1.3, is a distinct measure from partisan bias [35].
Competitiveness is certainly related to partisan bias in that districts with large numbers of packed
and cracked voters, which are typically biased, will exhibit less competitiveness than they might if
they were drawn fairly. Despite this, Nagle points out that maximizing competitiveness alone is not
necessarily an obvious way to achieve fair districting, and it is even less so a diagnostic for assessing
gerrymandering on its own [41]. For example, South Carolina requires a certain level of incumbency
protection that prevents state legislators running for reelection from being intentionally written out
of their own districts, which results in districts with a somewhat lower competitiveness measure [26].
On the other hand, the League of Women Voters holds a position on redistricting policy that explic-
itly rejects incumbency protection [36]. There is thus a lack of agreement on whether the protection
of incumbents is actually harmful or not in the drawing of fair election maps. As a result, a measure
that indicates lack of competitiveness is not necessarily a diagnostic for partisan bias.
Analyzing competitiveness of districting plans can, however, be useful when paired alongside
another metric that assesses partisan symmetry. For example, Chikina et al. use the variance of the
district vote proportions alongside the median-mean metric to assess the competitiveness of the 2011
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High values of variance represent anti-competitive districting plans and low values represent com-
petitive plans [22]. The authors are careful to point out, however, that high-variance districtings can
exist which do not favor either party, so the variance measure of competitiveness is not a rigorous
enough diagnostic to be utilized on its own.
2.2.6 Bias Measures in Summary
As demonstrated in this section, there are a variety of measures that appear in the literature
to assess various aspects of gerrymandered election maps. However, only some of them assess partisan
bias as it relates to the definition of partisan symmetry, which is considered to be the standard
definition of fairness for purposes of this thesis. A summary of the partisan bias measures that are
utilized in the analysis of the South Carolina election maps (see Chapter 4) is presented in Table 2.1
for reference.
Measure Symbol Meaning
Median-Mean MM MM < 0 indicates Republican advantage
Bias Point Estimate βˆ(V ) βˆ(V ) < 0 indicates Republican advantage
Geometric Bias BG Ŝ(0.5) < 0.5 and 0 < BG ≤ 1 indicate
Republican advantage
Table 2.1: A summary of the partisan bias measures considered for the analysis presented in Chap-
ter 4, with the Democratic party serving as the reference party.
While the median-mean metric has been used extensively in the literature, the bias point
estimate and geometric bias measures were developed much more recently and are thus not widely
used. For this reason, the work in this thesis is presented to shed light on how the latter two measures
perform as indicators of partisan bias compared to the more commonly understood metric provided
by MM when evaluated on the same map. In addition, we seek to understand how the values of
such measures compare between gerrymandered versus fair maps, as exemplified by the 2011 and
2018 Pennsylvania redistricting plans, respectively. Understanding the similarities and differences
between these various measures of partisan fairness is crucial in order to maintain transparency
about how they can be applied to evaluate election maps.
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2.3 Outlier Analysis
Once one or several measures of partisan bias are chosen for analysis of an election map,
the question remains of whether or not the statistic obtained is considered “extreme” enough to be
considered too unfair. This question is further complicated by the observation that election maps
will often generate some level of bias independent of efforts made by mapmakers to gerrymander;
for some states, the political geography alone is enough to exhibit asymmetry. One example of how
this occurs is the tendency of Democratic voters to be clustered in densely populated urban areas,
thus weakening the power of their votes [20]. The concern that a measure of asymmetry alone is
not enough to reliably assess partisan intention to gerrymander was expressed by Justice Kennedy
in LULAC v. Perry, prompting advocates of the fight to end gerrymandering to figure out how
this obstacle may be overcome when it is one of the most reliable ways to detect partisan bias as
currently exists [5].
One method that has been developed by several mathematicians and adapted for specific
state analyses is that of outlier analysis. This method fixes the political geography of the state —
including the population and votes cast in each precinct — and subjects all possible maps drawn
to the same criteria as the map in question, such as compactness and contiguity specifications. A
large sample of redistricting plans is then generated through a selected algorithm to produce “a
large set of legally viable maps” that conveys districting plans that are possible given the conditions
under which the original map was drawn [33]. If the original map then exhibits more bias than the
majority of maps generated, exhibiting outlier values of the bias metric imposed on each map, then
it is likely that the map was drawn with some partisan intent and can be considered reasonably
suspect for gerrymandering.
2.3.1 Simulation Approach
Chen and Rodden demonstrate the effectiveness of the outlier analysis method by applying it
to the 2012 Florida Congressional map [20]. In their algorithm, they simulate a large sample of maps
by starting with the current precinct map and allowing each precinct to be its own “district.” One of
these small districts is then randomly selected and aggregated with its nearest-centroid neighbor to
form a new district, subject to population equality constraints, and this process is repeated until the
number of districts is equal to the number of apportioned Congressional or legislative seats present.
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This process is repeated multiple times to generate maps that are valid districting plans under the
criteria of the state. In Chen and Rodden’s analysis, they were able to generate a sample of 1,000
possible electoral maps with 24 districts using the 7,349 precincts (or clusters of precincts) in the
2012 Florida map. They then used these simulated maps to analyze how many seats would have
been won under the alternative districting plans compared to the original map. The enacted plan
of the Florida legislature won more Republican seats than all simulated plans, implying that the
mapmakers likely drew the plan with partisan intent.
2.3.2 Markov Chain Approach
The approach utilized in this paper and applied to the Congressional and legislative maps of
South Carolina follows that of Chikina et al. in their analysis of the 2011 Pennsylvania Congressional
map in LWV v. PA. In their 2017 publication in PNAS, Chikina et al. use Markov chain theory to
describe a method of detecting gerrymandering by generating a large sample of maps and testing
the probability that a current districting plan came from an unbiased distribution of possible maps
[22].
One may recall that a discrete-time Markov chain M on a state space Σ is a sequence of
random variables X0, X1, . . . taking values in Σ such that each step of the chain to a new state
depends only on the previous state of the chain in what is known as the Markov property [46]. In
other words, for states i0, i1, . . . ik−1, i, j ∈ Σ,
P (Xk+1 = j | X0 = i0, X1 = i1, . . . , Xk−1 = ik−1, Xk = i) = P (Xk+1 = j | Xk = i) . (2.15)
We call the likelihood of transitioning from state i to state j in a single step of the chain the transition
probability from i to j, denoted pi,j . These transition probabilities form a |Σ| × |Σ| matrix P called
the probability transition matrix for the Markov chain M.
Stated in terms of an application to detecting gerrymandering, a Markov chain M can
be defined as a sequence of random possible districtings of an election map, starting at the initial
map X0, where the state space Σ represents all possible valid districtings (i.e., all ways of drawing
district boundary lines subject to redistricting guideline constraints). The transition probabilities
correspond to the probabilities of moving from one districting to another by randomly swapping the
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district membership of a single precinct6 that lies along the current boundary of a district. The
manner in which these transition probabilities are defined7 ensures that M converges to a uniform
stationary distribution, so taking a random walk along the chain will result in a sample of election
maps that are all given equal weight; in other words, there is an equally likely chance of generating
any particular districting under the current conditions.
A challenge when dealing with Markov chains applied to real-world situations is that, even
when a stationary distribution is known to exist, it is difficult to estimate how many steps are
required for the chain to converge to it. The time it takes for a run of a Markov chain to converge
is referred to as the mixing time, and heuristically, sampling from the stationary distribution is
sometimes performed by taking a random walk along the chain for some large number of steps
and “hoping that sufficient mixing has occurred” [22]. Chikina et al., however, define a more
rigorous approach that allows one to determine whether a given map was drawn from the stationary
distribution knowing nothing beyond the reversibility of the chain, which provides an effective way
of handling a Markov chain with an unknown mixing time. The Markov chain M described above
and in Appendix A is reversible as a result of its construction, and this property combined with its
unknown mixing time make it an ideal candidate for an application of this approach.
To approach this problem, a real-valued label function ω : Σ→ R is first defined on the state
space such that, for every state i ∈ Σ, the label function value ω(i) associates a numeric measure
with that step of the chain. In context of analyzing an electoral map, this label function can be
chosen to be one of the bias measures discussed in Section 2.2, resulting in a bias measure being
calculated for every possible districting in the state space.
Paraphrased in context, the theorem developed and proved by Chikina et al. states that,
under the null hypothesis that the current map was drawn from the stationary distribution of all
possible maps (i.e., X0 ∼ pi), the probability that we observe an electoral map at least as biased as






where b is the number of maps with bias measures at least as “extreme” as the observed map and
6Precincts are used because they are the smallest geographical unit for which state voting data is available.
7Both the description of the transition probabilities for P and the proof of the resulting properties of the Markov
chain M are described in Appendix A.
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2n is the total number of new maps generated, corresponding to the number of steps taken in a
random walk along the Markov chain. Chikina et al. call this test the
√
ε test, where ε = b2n+1 , or
the fraction of maps in the sample that are as unusual or more so than the original map8. Being
able to impose a bound of
√
2ε on this probability is powerful, given the complexity of the state
space and unknown mixing time of the chain.
To illustrate an application of the
√
ε test, consider the analysis of the 2011 Pennsylvania
Congressional map. Using the median-mean bias metric as a label function for the Markov chain,
generated maps were subjected to a constraint of 2% or less deviation from equal district populations
and a threshold for the worst compactness scores allowed was set. With the algorithm written to
randomly choose precincts, perform swaps, and calculate the label function values at each step, the
chain was run for 240 steps and the probability was found to be p = 3.3896 ·10−5, which corresponds
to approximately 632 out of one trillion maps exhibiting bias measures as extreme as those of the
current map. This leads one to conclude that, for any randomly generated district drawn under
the same conditions as a reasonable map, the probability of obtaining a map as biased as or more
biased than the original is small, which serves as strong evidence that the map is unusual and hence
suggests partisan intent. This analysis was ultimately used by Pegden in his expert witness report
in LWV v. PA [43].
The choice of label function for the Markov chain is no small matter, and ω should be chosen
with careful consideration based on the properties of the electoral map one wishes to assess. Chikina
et al. list two criteria for what might be considered a “good” label function [22]:
1. The label function should likely be different for gerrymandered election maps than it is for
typical maps.
2. The label function should be sensitive enough to detect small changes in the adjusting of
district boundary lines.
For example, in the Pennsylvania analysis, Chikina et al. employ the use of two label functions:
median-mean (Equation 2.10) and variance9 (Equation 2.14). Median-mean is chosen because, in
8Chikina et al.’s naming of the
√
ε test follows from the definition of an ε-outlier, described in Appendix B. Details
are also provided to assist the reader in understanding the proof of the theorem in the PNAS paper.
9High values for variance represent anti-competitive districtings, while low values correspond to competitive dis-
trictings. In the Markov chain analysis, the negative variance of district-wide vote proportions is used, with values that
are more negative corresponding to highly anti-competitive districtings. This is to correspond with the directionality
we see in most outlier values of bias measures; for example, for the median-mean measure, more negative values of
MM corresponding to districtings that have a Republican advantage.
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addition to being an agreed-upon standard throughout gerrymandering literature, it fits the first
criterion of a label function fairly well; it represents the skewness of the vote distribution and
a deviation from partisan symmetry, and as a result, outlier values of MM are likely to reflect
gerrymandering. The disadvantage of using median-mean is that it is a rather slow-changing function
with respect to the number of steps in the chain, causing it to only moderately satisfy the second
criterion. Though it will vary slightly with alterations in the district lines, the mean district vote
proportion V is relatively stable for a map regardless of how the districts are drawn. Because of
this, the value of MM only changes significantly when the median changes, and this only occurs if
a precinct swap is made to one specific district out of the L districts (or two districts if L is even).
On the other hand, the negative variance of district-wide Democratic vote proportions is
suspected by Chikina et al. to be “a good label function from the standpoint of the first characteristic
. . . but a great label function from the standpoint of the second characteristic” [22]. This is because
it is very sensitive to small changes in districtings and, in contrast to MM, changes to any district
will directly affect it. While this measure of competitiveness alone might not necessarily be sufficient
to suggest a map is gerrymandered for the reasons stated in Subsection 2.2.5, it can be powerful
when paired with a measure of partisan symmetry like median-mean, as outlier values correspond
with the highly anti-competitive districts we might expect to see in a gerrymandered map.
Chikina et al. limit their analysis to the use of only two metrics to emphasize that the
theorem applies regardless of which label function is chosen and that they did not need to look far
to find a label function that exhibited evidence of extreme bias for the Pennsylvania map. However,
they propose that it may be possible to choose label functions that are a better fit for the data and
achieve higher statistical significance for gerrymandered maps. In fact, they even suggest that the
geometric BG measure developed by Nagle might be a bias measure that fits both of their criteria
for rigorous label functions.
In the analysis presented in Chapter 4 of his thesis, we follow Chikina et al.’s use of median-
mean as a label function for the Markov chain approach to outlier analysis, as it is a recognized
measure of partisan bias with widespread historical usage. We also perform the analysis using
geometric partisan bias BG under both the uniform and variable partisan swing assumptions, as well
as the bias point estimate β(V ), as alternative label functions. These measures are compared to one
another on the 2011 Pennsylvania Congressional map, a known gerrymander, and the redrawn 2018
map that resulted from the proceedings of LWV v. PA, which is considered to be fair. The results of
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the Pennsylvania analyses are then used to inform the interpretation of results from similar methods
applied to the 2011 Congressional and legislative maps for South Carolina. This study allows for
insights to be drawn as to how outlier analysis results vary for biased versus unbiased maps and how




To conduct a thorough assessment of one or more election maps for partisan fairness, infor-
mation is needed about precinct-level voting data, the state population, and the boundary lines of
the districting plans in question. Unfortunately, as is the case in South Carolina, these data may
exist independently of one another and must be gathered from several sources. Further, it is not un-
common for there to be discrepancies between the data sets, which must therefore undergo an intense
data cleaning process to be usable for analysis. The data needed for this analysis as well as neces-
sary modifications that were made are detailed in this chapter. All shapefile manipulations described
were performed in ArcMap 10.6.1, and data management was primarily handled through Python 2.7
scripts and Microsoft Excel. Associated files for this thesis are available in a public GitHub repository
for this project at https://github.com/vagnozzia408/gerrymandering public.
3.1 The District Maps
The first piece of data needed for any gerrymandering analysis is the set of election maps
themselves. The shapefiles for the 2011 Pennsylvania Congressional map that was disputed in LWV
v. PA were acquired via personal correspondence with Maria Chikina, and the shapefiles for the
remedial plan that took effect in 2018 were obtained through the Pennsylvania Judicial System
website [53]. Each map contains eighteen Congressional districts. In this thesis, these alternative
maps serve as the standards for significantly biased and reasonably fair, respectively, in light of the
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court regarding the original map.
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Figure 3.1: The original 2011 Pennsylvania Congressional map drawn during the redistricting cycle
immediately following the 2010 Census.
Figure 3.2: The remedial Congressional map drawn for Pennsylvania that took place in 2018 after
the 2011 plan was decided by the state court to be a gerrymander.
We also analyze the 2011 South Carolina Congressional map and the state legislative dis-
trictings of the South Carolina Senate and South Carolina House of Representatives. These three
maps were drawn following the 2010 Census and will remain unchanged until the conclusion of the
2020 Census. Shapefiles for each district map were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau [54, 55, 56].
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Figure 3.3: The 2011 South Carolina Congressional map, which contains seven districts.
(a) 2011 Senate Map (46 Districts) (b) 2011 House Map (124 Districts)
Figure 3.4: The 2011 South Carolina legislative districting plans.
A notable feature of the 2011 Congressional map in South Carolina is that, in contrast
with other state maps that have been analyzed through outlier analysis, it has significantly fewer
Congressional districts, with only seven seats. Little appears in the literature about how partisan
bias measures and outlier analysis perform for election maps with a small number of districts, and
while not a primary aspect of this study, a potential experiment to test whether fewer districts
affects the sensitivity of such methods in detecting partisan bias is proposed in Chapter 5.
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3.2 The Voting Data
Both the practice of partisan gerrymandering and the methods for detecting it rely on an
estimation of voting patterns among the constituents in a state. This presents a significant challenge,
as individual voter preferences can change between elections and be strongly dependent on current
events, the candidates, shifting political ideals, and any other manner of exogeneous influences on
the populace (defined in Subsection 2.1.1). However, though individual voter preferences are difficult
to estimate, statewide voter preferences as a whole are assumed to be relatively stable.
New data for general elections are only available every two years, which is a sufficient
amount of time for statewide voting shifts to occur, so gerrymandering analysis typically uses the
election results that would have taken place most recently before the contested districting was drawn.
Further, because estimating a distribution for voter preferences can be a difficult task, the results
of the election for a single race are usually chosen as a proxy for voting preferences across the
state. Pegden states in his expert witness report for LWV v. PA that a particular election will serve
as a good proxy if (1) it is a statewide race in which all voters will be choosing between the same
candidates, (2) there is no incumbent, and (3) it is among the most recent election results that would
have been available to mapmakers during the redistricting process for the map in question [43]. In
addition, because a two-party system is assumed for this analysis and third-party candidates seldom
earn a large number of votes in statewide elections, an appropriate proxy should have a relatively
small percentage of votes cast for candidates not running on a Republican or Democratic ballot.
Though all proxies are ultimately imperfect, Pegden argues that the use of a proxy makes it more
difficult to detect gerrymandering, and thus an analysis which yields evidence of partisan intent in
the redistricting process holds more weight, as it is able to detect unfairness despite an imperfect
approximation of voting behavior. The 2010 Pennsylvania senate race was chosen as the proxy for
analysis in LWV v. PA, meeting the above characteristics, and the vote counts for this race were
included as precinct attributes in the precinct shapefiles provided by Chikina et al., discussed in
Section 3.3.
The South Carolina Election Commission (SCEC) makes statewide voting data from gen-
eral elections dating back to 1968 publicly available for download online in CSV format. Data were
obtained for the 2010 gubernatorial election, which most closely fits the criteria for a reasonable
proxy [49]. In this statewide race in which neither candidate was running for reelection, Repub-
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lican candidate Nikki Haley defeated Democratic candidate Vincent Sheheen in a 51.37%–46.91%
statewide vote. The 1.72% of votes cast for third-party candidates is relatively small, and was
thus omitted from the vote totals for this analysis. Omitting these third-party votes adjusted the
statewide vote proportion to 52.27% Republican and 47.73% Democratic, which had no impact on
the outcome of the vote in each district or the state overall.
Voting data is broken down by precinct, the smallest geographical unit for which election
results are made available. Absentee votes and other “virtual precinct” ballots, however, are aggre-
gated by county. These votes accounted for 11.67% of the total number of votes cast in the election,
which was too significant to ignore, so these votes in each county were allocated to the precincts
in the county by the proportion of registered voters in each. All vote totals were rounded to the
nearest integer value of votes, which did not alter the overall statewide vote proportions.
3.3 The Precinct Maps
Voting precinct shapefiles for Pennsylvania were provided by Maria Chikina and include
the precinct-level vote counts from the proxy election as attributes for each of the 9,060 precincts.
In South Carolina, however, voting precinct shapefiles do not contain information about election
outcomes. The maps of precinct lines are maintained by a different government office than the
SCEC, which manages election data, and as a result the information exists separately and must be
merged.
Shapefiles of the voting precincts in South Carolina were obtained via personal correspon-
dence1 with Victor Frontroth at the South Carolina Revenue and Fiscal Affairs (RFA) Office [27]. In
addition to the precinct names, boundary lines, and the counties to which they belong, each precinct
in the shapefile has its population as an attribute. The precinct map provided is that which most
closely corresponds to the November 2010 General Election.
The precincts in the shapefiles available do not have exact one-to-one correspondence with
the precincts in the SCEC vote totals, so an exact join of the voting data to the geographic precincts
was not possible. One discrepancy is that the naming convention for precincts between the RFA
Office and the SCEC is not at all consistent. For example, discrepancies may include using the word
1While voting precinct maps for each county in South Carolina are available on the SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs
Office website at http://rfa.sc.gov/mapping/districts?o=5, data are in PDF format and precinct shapefiles are
not made publicly available.
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“and” versus an ampersand, using the abbreviation “Mt.” versus spelling out “Mount,” or using the
abbreviation “No.” for “number” versus using a hash symbol. These differences, while inconvenient,
are relatively straightforward to resolve.
A more challenging issue arises from the fact that precinct maps are determined by individual
counties and can change quite frequently. As a result, the precinct map most closely corresponding
to the election was still not an exact match for the precincts reported in the SCEC data. Several
precincts in the shapefile, for example, had been split following the 2010 General Election and needed
to be aggregated to correspond with the precinct voting data. Others had been aggregated only
following the election, and the geographic areas needed to be split into distinct regions corresponding
to the earlier precincts. In some cases, precincts had even been renamed.
Fortunately, even though the shapefiles available do not capture the South Carolina precincts
exactly as they were in November 2010 at the time of the General Election, there are ways to resolve
these discrepancies as well. Any time a precinct is altered within a county, it is recorded in Title 7 -
Elections, Chapter 7 - Polling Precincts and Voting Places, of the South Carolina Code
of Laws [32]. Further, additional shapefiles were obtained from RFA for precinct maps from early
2010 and from 2014 to provide reference points before and after the election and capture some of the
changes to precinct boundaries. Several iterations of data cleaning were performed to resolve the
discrepancies between the voting data and shapefiles, which involved comparing the main precinct
map against the others provided by RFA and using the South Carolina Code of Laws from various
years to corroborate any changes made.
Once the precincts from the voting data and the shapefile matched, the SCEC data were
joined to the RFA shapefile so that each geographic precinct included the respective numbers of
Democratic and Republican votes as attributes. Minor topological errors in the map were resolved
in ArcMap, and any precincts contained wholly inside another were merged with the surrounding
precinct in which they formed a “hole.” This latter adjustment was made so that swapping the
district membership of an outer, surrounding precinct does not violate the contiguity principle for
a districting by forcing the inner precinct to become disconnected from its other precinct neighbors
in the district. Population and voter data from inner precincts were aggregated with those of their
surrounding precincts.
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(a) Precinct with a Hole (b) Inner Precinct Merged with Outer
Figure 3.5: An example of a precinct “hole” that was merged to the surrounding precinct.
The resulting South Carolina precinct map consisted of a total of 2,128 voting precincts.
Figure 3.6: The resulting precinct map of South Carolina.
3.4 Markov Chain Input Files
To generate the input file used in the
√
ε test for outlier analysis, additional calculations
were made to include all necessary attributes used in a run of the Markov chain. In particular,
information is needed about the precincts and their relationships to one another in order to perform
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swaps, so an adjacency list must be generated for the precinct map under each districting plan being
analyzed. The resulting attribute table for the precinct data was then formatted as a tab-delimited
text file as per the specifications used in the Pennsylvania analysis by Chikina et al. A summary of
relevant precinct attributes for the South Carolina maps can be found in Table 3.12.
Attribute Description
PSN Unique ID for each precinct (indexed 0, . . . , 2127)
nb List of the indices of neighboring precincts in clockwise order
sp List of corresponding shared perimeter lengths (in m) of neighboring precincts
area Area of the precinct (in m2)
pop Population of the precinct
voteA Number of votes cast for Democratic (reference party) candidate
voteB Number of votes cast for Republican candidate
congD Congressional district in which the precinct belongs (indexed 1, . . . , 7)
senD Senate district in which the precinct belongs (indexed 1, . . . , 46)
houseD House district in which the precinct belongs (indexed 1, . . . , 124)
county Name of the county to which the precinct belongs
Table 3.1: Precinct attributes utilized in the Markov Chain outlier analysis.
Distinct text files containing the precinct-level data were generated for the 2011 South
Carolina Congressional district map, the state Senate district map, and the state House district
map, as well as for the alternative districing plans for the Pennsylvania Congressional map. These
five input files capture all relevant information required for the outlier analysis detailed in Chapter 4.
2The neighbor calculations for nb and sp were performed using data exported from ArcMap and manipulated using
an auxiliary Python script. Precincts that touch only at a point were not considered to be neighbors. The numbers
designating congD, senD, and houseD were assigned by performing an overlap of the precinct shapefile with each of the
district shapefiles and assigning precincts to the district containing the largest percentage of its area. (The district
membership of a few precincts that fell between districts was manually adjusted to maintain the principle of district





Recall that the goal of this thesis is twofold: (1) to provide a state-specific analysis of South
Carolina to evaluate the likelihood of partisan gerrymandering, and (2) to increase transparency in
the use and interpretation of partisan bias measures and outlier analysis as a diagnostic for unfair
maps. To accomplish the second goal, the following questions are explored:
 How do bias measures and outlier analysis results compare for gerrymandered versus fair maps?
 How do bias measures and outlier analysis results compare to one another on a given map?
4.1 Methodology
The methods utilized in this analysis follow those of Chikina et al. used in LWV v. PA.
Namely, the
√
ε test described in Subsection 2.3.2 was applied to assess the fairness of the South
Carolina Congressional, Senate, and House district maps drawn following the 2010 Census, which
have been in place since the redistricting process concluded in 2011. The test was also applied to
the 2011 Pennsylvania Congressional map to replicate the results presented in LWV v. PA, as well
as the remedial 2018 Pennsylvania plan, which had not been analyzed prior to this study. Recall
that the
√
ε test is conducted on each map by using a discrete time Markov chain to generate a large
sample of possible districtings that could occur for the state, given the appropriate redistricting
constraints. Although it is possible that maps are repeated in the sample, the uniform stationary
distribution of the Markov chain constructed ensures that each possible map is considered with equal
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weight [22, 43]. The sample of maps generated despite the unknown mixing time of the chain allows
us to determine an upper bound on the probability of observing a map as biased as the current map
with respect to some label function, under the assumption that the current map was drawn from
the stationary distribution of all “typical” districtings. If this probability is extremely small, there
is then evidence to suggest that the current map is highly unusual and likely to have been crafted
with partisan intent.
Specifically, the null hypothesis to be tested for each map with respect to a given label
function is
H0 : X0 ∼ pi,
where X0 is the initial election map and pi is the uniform stationary distribution of “typical” dis-
trictings. For this analysis, we use a significance level of α = 0.001 to judge the results of the
outlier analysis; achieving statistical significance in this context means that there is a less than 0.1%
likelihood of observing a map as biased as the current map by chance alone. While this significance
level is disputable, as court definitions of how unlikely a map’s bias must be before it is considered a
gerrymander may vary, it was chosen in accordance with the results of LWV v. PA. In the analysis
of the 2011 Pennsylvania Congressional map, the
√
ε test yielded p-values of at most 0.001 and was
deemed acceptable evidence of partisan gerrymandering by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. We
thus consider α = 0.001 to be a reasonable threshold for significance in this analysis.
Multiple partisan bias measures described in Section 2.2 were selected to provide a more
comprehensive and rigorous analysis of the maps than has previously been available, as well as to
observe how such measures that have not been previously used as label functions perform under
the Markov chain outlier analysis. The maps were subjected to a series of differing constraints
that restrict the possible districtings generated to those that follow state and federal redistricting
guidelines as described in Section 1.1.
4.1.1 Selection of Bias Measures
Several partisan bias measures were chosen to serve as label functions of the Markov chain.
All of the measures chosen correspond with the definition of partisan symmetry, which is defined as
the standard for fairness in this thesis. The properties of “good” label functions — those that are
likely to take on different values for gerrymandered districts and be sensitive to small changes in
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the districtings — were considered when choosing appropriate measures to utilize in the chain. For
the same reasons stated by Chikina et al., median-mean (Equation 2.10) was used as the baseline
measure to replicate the analysis performed in Pennsylvania. The performance of the median-mean
metric as an indicator of potential partisan gerrymandering is relatively well-known and observable
from the LWV v. PA analysis, and thus this bias measure was chosen to be consistent with previous
literature. Using median-mean as the standard for what we expect in a label function, we should
expect any other reasonable label function chosen in this context to perform similarly to median-
mean as an indicator of bias.
Along with median-mean, three alternative partisan bias measures were added to provide
a more comprehensive analysis of the South Carolina maps. The bias point estimate βˆ(V ) from
Equation 2.9 is considered due to the fact that it is directly defined as the deviation from partisan
symmetry, which is considered for purposes of this paper to be the standard by which partisan
“fairness” is quantified. Because βˆ(V ) is computed from an estimation of the seats-votes curve, the
uniform partisan swing assumption used by Katz et al. is also applied here when computing the bias
point estimate. This measure is expected to fare well from the standpoint of the first criterion of
a good label function, as extreme quantities of βˆ(V ) are associated with the large deviation from
symmetry expected in gerrymandered maps. The bias point estimate is a rather slow-changing
function, however, and will only moderately satisfy the second criterion at best. This slow-changing
nature results from the fact that its value changes only when shifts in district-level vote proportions
cause a seat to flip between parties.
The other two measures used are variations of the geometric bias measure BG defined by
Nagle and suggested by Chikina et al. as a potentially good measure of partisan bias that meets
both criteria of a good label function [22, 41]. Because this measure relies on an estimation of the
seats-votes curve, we consider the curves constructed using the outcome of a single election under
both the uniform partisan swing (UPS) and variable partisan swing1 (VPS) assumptions, described
in Methods 2 and 3 of Subsection 2.1.3. These two estimated curves are then used to compute
the corresponding geometric bias measures for each sample election map. To distinguish between
these two values, the measures are denoted BG,U and BG,V to identify the measure of BG as it is
computed under the UPS and VPS assumptions, respectively. The primary difference between the
geometric bias measures and those used previously for outlier analysis is that BG does not have an
1Recall that Nagle’s original usage is defined under the variable partisan swing assumption.
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associated sign indicating the direction of bias; rather, it is a quantity measuring overall deviation
from partisan symmetry. The direction of bias can be determined for the initial map by graphing
the seats-votes curve, but this direction is not observed for each sample map generated along the
Markov chain.
Comparing several bias measures across the same map when both applied initially and
utilized in outlier analysis makes it possible to identify how sensitive such measures are to partisan
bias. We would expect for various measures that all purport to measure partisan asymmetry to
perform reasonably similarly for the same election map, with none giving a particular “advantage”
in detecting bias over the others. Again, because median-mean is considered in the literature to be
a reasonable indicator of bias, results for alternative label functions will be compared against those
for MM to gain insight into their performance.
4.1.2 Constraints
When performing Markov chain outlier analysis in this context, there are several constraints
that may be imposed as the chain takes a series of steps to generate a sample of possible election
maps. Each of these constraints is typically chosen to correspond with an associated redistricting
guideline that occurs at the federal or state level. The constraints used in this analysis are described
as follows.
 Roughly Equal Populations. To comply with the redistricting principle of maintaining ap-
proximately equipopulous districts, bounds on the maximum deviation from the ideal district
population (total population divided by number of districts) may be specified. The bounds
used in this analysis for Congressional maps were tested at 1% and 2%, representing relatively
small deviations that correspond to the state guidelines of having district populations as equal
as possible. Senate and House maps were subjected to population deviations of 5% and 2.5%,
respectively, to match the guidelines of each legislative judiciary committee [26, 45].
 Compactness Thresholds. Though compactness is somewhat ill-defined in the South Carolina
redistricting guidelines, one can specify bounds on how “bizarre” districts may be among the
sample of generated maps by using more well-defined mathematical measures. This bound
is typically chosen to be a value just beyond that of the current districting, ensuring that
any generated map is no worse than the current one with regard to compactness. The mea-
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sures chosen for this analysis mirror those used in the Pennsylvania analysis. The first is the




where Pd is the perimeter in the specified units for district d. The second compactness measure
used is the inverse Polsby-Popper threshold (referred to as the L1 compactness metric in






where the Polsby-Popper measure2 Cd for a district d finds the ratio of the district’s area Ad to





 County Preservation. One may require that any counties which are contained fully within a
district in the initial map be preserved when making precinct swaps to generate new maps,
meaning that precincts whose swaps break the county across districts will not be chosen. This
constraint is more important for larger Congressional districts than it is for Senate and House
districts, which are in general smaller and may be less likely to contain entire counties. This
constraint is one way of maintaining the redistricting principle of preserving communities of
interest, so maps were analyzed both with and without this constraint. It should be noted,
though, that in the 2011 South Carolina maps, district boundary lines frequently cut across
precincts, so this constraint may not be as realistic as some of the others.
 Frozen Districts. Minority-majority districts — districts in which the majority of constituents
are non-white or racial or ethnic minorities — that were drawn in compliance with the Vot-
ing Rights Act can be frozen to ensure that minority demographics maintain representation
in Congress. This applies only to Congressional districts, as Senate and House districts do
2The Polsby-Popper metric always has values between 0 and 1, with a circle having a “perfect” compactness score
of 1, which is impossible to observe for every district in an election map. The sum of the inverse Polsby-Popper
measures for the districts is used so an upper bound can be placed on the compactness threshold to be consistent with
other metrics used.
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not typically have minority-majority districts. This constraint may also be considered to cor-
respond with the redistricting principle of preserving communities of interest, so the South
Carolina Congressional map was analyzed both with and without this constraint.
4.2 Code Used to Perform Analysis
The C++ code used to perform the analysis was obtained from Pegden’s faculty webpage,
where it is available for public use, along with the input files used in the Pennsylvania analysis [21].
The code takes as input a tab-delimited text file containing the precinct adjacency list for a given
district map as described in Section 3.4. Then, using the observed election map as the initial
state of the Markov chain, successive precinct swaps are simulated to generate a sample of possible
election maps. For each map, the value of the partisan bias measure specified as the label function is
computed and recorded as either “more unusual” or “less unusual” than the original map in terms of
its degree of bias. The p-value stated in Equation 2.16 is also computed at every step, representing
the probability of observing an election map with a label function value at least as extreme as the
original map. Output reports containing the bias measure of an intermediate map in the sample, the
proportion ε of generated sample maps at least as biased as the original, and the associated p-value
are produced every 222 steps so the behavior of the chain can be observed.
4.2.1 Modifications to Code
The code as it was originally utilized in Pennsylvania includes the median-mean measure,
as well as options to set the four constraints described in Subsection 4.1.2. Additional measures of
deviation from partisan symmetry, however, were not found to have been used as label functions for
the Markov chain prior to this analysis, so the algorithms for computing the measures for a given
election map were coded into the program. The three measures for which code was added are:
 The bias point estimate from the seats-votes curve, βˆ(V );
 Geometric partisan bias under the UPS assumption, BG,U ; and
 Geometric partisan bias under the VPS assumption, BG,V .
Recall that Methods 2 and 3 in Subsection 2.1.3 describe the algorithms used to construct
the estimated seats-votes curve Ŝ(V ) under the uniform and variable partisan swing assumptions,
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respectively. Constructing the seats-votes curve is necessary to find its inverse Ŝ−1(V ) and to
subsequently calculate the corresponding measure of geometric bias BG. These algorithms, however,
do not consider the case when a tie is observed in an electoral district. Exact ties are seldom observed
in election outcomes, but when generating billions of sample maps by randomly swapping precincts
between districts and calculating the hypothetical election outcomes using precinct vote counts,
encountering a sample map where a tie does occur is unsurprising.
To make these algorithms suitable to calculate BG,U and BG,V for each step of the Markov
chain, one additional modification to the code was needed to allow for a way of breaking ties when
they occur. The code was adjusted so that, if a precinct swap results in a tie in some district d with
district vote proportion vd = 0.5, the equivalent of a random coin flip is performed to determine
whether to allocate the seat to Democrats or Republicans. In other words, if vd = 0.5 for some
d ∈ {1, . . . , L} on a given step of the Markov chain, then:
 Randomly generate a zero or a one with equal probability.
– If the random number generated is zero, adjust the district vote share vd to vd − 1 vote.
– If the random number generated is one, adjust the district vote share vd to vd + 1 vote.
 Proceed with analysis using the adjusted vote shares.
This is, in fact, how some tied elections for legislative offices are handled in the United States, with
twenty-seven states legally determining winners by drawing lots or some other random process, such
as a coin toss [42]. While South Carolina is among the states that hold runoff elections in the event
of a tie, the method of determining the winner of a tied election at random is common enough that
it was considered a reasonable and computationally straightforward way to modify this analysis in
a manner that could apply to any state.
4.2.2 Verification and Implementation
To verify that the code was running properly, the 2011 Pennsylvania Congressional map
provided by Chikina et al. was run through the chain program to ensure that the resulting p-values
for median-mean aligned with those reported in the LWV v. PA analysis. The alternative label
functions discussed in Subsection 4.2.1 were also applied to the original Pennsylvania map. The
√
ε test was then implemented on the 2018 Pennsylvania Congressional map and the 2011 South
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Carolina maps for Congressional, state Senate, and state House districts, each under differing sets
of redistricting constraints and with respect to each of the alternative label functions.
All instances of the code were run on the Clemson University Palmetto Cluster. In total,
288 instances were run to observe the outcome of the test for varying combinations of maps, label
functions, and constraints. The geometric measures of partisan bias are more computationally
expensive than the others, so the instances of the code that used BG,U and BG,V as label functions
were run separately from and for fewer steps than those using median-mean and the bias point
estimate. Similarly, both South Carolina legislative maps contain a much larger number of districts
(46 for Senate and 124 for House), which causes the chain to run much more slowly, so a smaller
number of steps was chosen. While the
√
ε test will work for any number of steps taken along the
Markov chain, with larger numbers of steps yielding more powerful results, it should be noted that
even 235 generated maps is still a large sample of possible districtings, representing over 34 billion
maps.
Maps Bias Measures Constraints Steps
PA 2011, PA 2018,
SC Congressional
MM, βˆ(V ) Compactness, Frozen District,
Population, County Preservation
240
PA 2011, PA 2018,
SC Congressional













SC Senate BG,U Compactness, Population,
County Preservation
237
SC House BG,U Compactness, Population,
County Preservation
235
Table 4.1: Summary of the analyses run on the Palmetto Cluster.
4.3 The Standard: Pennsylvania
Though the analysis of the 2011 Pennsylvania map in LWV v. PA exhibits the type of
results we might expect to observe for gerrymandered maps, there is scant empirical information in
the literature about what results to expect for “fair” maps. For example, we know from the 2011
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Pennsylvania map that the p-values resulting from the outlier analysis will likely be quite small
for gerrymandered maps, as the p-values reported by Chikina et al. were less than 0.001 for all
constraint combinations they tested [22, 43]. However, for reasonably fair maps, how many maps
of a worse or equally bad bias measure would need to be observed in a sample before the current
election map is considered to not be unusual? Correspondingly, would we expect to see p-values
hovering around 0.05, just outside traditionally accepted bounds for significance? Or would these
p-values be much larger, indicating that a large proportion of maps exhibited partisan bias as bad
as our original map? As both the original map determined to be gerrymandered and the redrawn
map are publicly available, Pennsylvania provides us with a reasonable basis for comparison. The
√
ε test was run on the Pennsylvania precinct map using both the 2011 and 2018 Congressional
districting plans, which are considered unfair and fair, respectively. The resulting range of p-values
across different combinations of constraints imposed on the map allow us to observe how the outlier
analysis performs for biased and unbiased maps, all other things being held equal.
As results are compared for the two Pennsylvania Congressional maps, it is noteworthy to
observe how election outcomes would have fared under the 2018 redistricting plan. While the new
plan drew much attention because Democrats won a significant 9 out of 18 seats in the 2018 General
Election (as opposed to the 5 out of 18 won in 2012 under the old plan), this result occurred after
nearly eight years of voting shifts and changes to the political climate. When subjected to the same
voting proxy used in Chikina et al.’s analysis of the 2011 Congressional map, one can observe that
the new plan results in Democrats winning 6 out of 18 seats, which is only one additional seat than
was won under the original legislature-produced plan in the 2012 General Election. In other words,
using the same voting data that would have been available to the state legislature at the time the
gerrymandered plan was produced, it can be ascertained that, had the legislature produced the
more fair plan, Democrats still would have only won six seats and not nine. This remark is not to
discount the positive effects of redistricting on producing a more unbiased map, but rather to keep
the comparative bias of the original plan and effects of the redrawn plan on election outcomes in
perspective.
4.3.1 Initial Characteristics of the Pennsylvania Maps
Before the outlier analysis results are examined, we can observe several initial characteristics
of the Pennsylvania election maps, starting with the estimated seats-votes curves under both the
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UPS and VPS assumptions, which can be seen in Figure 4.1. The estimated seats-votes curves
are strikingly similar in the 0.4 < V < 0.6 region under both assumptions; however, deviations
from similarity occur in the tails. Particularly, the tails of the curves drawn under the VPS in
Subfigure 4.1b indicate more conservative estimates of the degree of partisan swing required to shift
a seat from Democrat to Republican, or vice versa.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0


























Comparison of Pennsylvania Map Seats-Votes Curves 
 Under the Uniform Partisan Swing Assumption
S(V), 2011 PA Map
S(V), 2018 PA Map
(a) Uniform Partisan Swing Assumption
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Comparison of Pennsylvania Map Seats-Votes Curves 
 Under the Variable Partisan Swing Assumption
S(V), 2011 PA Map
S(V), 2018 PA Map
(b) Variable Partisan Swing Assumption
Figure 4.1: Comparison of the estimated seats-votes curves for the 2011 and 2018 Pennsylvania
Congressional maps, drawn under both the UPS and VPS assumptions.
Focusing on the effect of the new redistricting plan on the estimated seats-votes curve,
recall from Subsection 2.2.3 that nonzero geometric bias represents a Republican advantage when
Ŝ(0.5) < 0.5, which can be seen for each of the curves in Figure 4.1. By comparing the curves for the
2011 and 2018 Pennsylvania maps on the same graph, we can observe that under both assumptions,
the graph of Ŝ(V ) for the 2018 redistricting plan is shifted to the left of the 2011 plan curve and
is closer to passing through the (0.5, 0.5) midpoint. This shift reflects an overall improvement in
partisan symmetry of the Pennsylvania election map under the redrawn plan.
The initial values of the selected bias measures for Pennsylvania under both redistricting
plans can also be computed and are summarized in Table 4.2. While it is necessary to perform
outlier analysis in order to assess whether these values are “bad enough” to be considered the result
of gerrymandering, the initial values are still beneficial in providing a first look at the bias of a map,
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as nonzero values of median-mean, the bias point estimate, and geometric partisan bias can serve
as useful indicators of partisan asymmetry.
Map MM βˆ(V ) BG,U BG,V
2011 Plan −0.0626 −0.2222 0.0942 0.0675
2018 Plan −0.0209 −0.1389 0.0525 0.0353
Table 4.2: Initial bias measure values for the 2011 and 2018 PA Congressional maps.
The new redistricting plan resulted in improvement in all four measures of partisan bias
shown in Table 4.2, shifting each closer to zero. The values of median-mean and the bias point
estimate remain negative for the 2018 plan, representing a Republican advantage, but some natural
bias in the election map is not unreasonable to observe, and the degree of bias is noticeably less under
the 2018 plan for both measures. Similarly, the positive values of the two geometric bias measures
under the 2018 plan still indicate some asymmetry, which we know is in favor of Republicans by
looking at the seats-votes curves, but the degree of asymmetry is substantially reduced. The values of
BG,U and BG,V are also of particular interest because they can be compared visually. In Figure 4.2,
the inverted seats-votes curves are represented by dashed lines, and the area between the original
and inverted curves, which represents geometric bias, is shaded on each graph. We can see that the
area between Ŝ(V ) and Ŝ−1(V ) for the 2018 redistricting plan is noticeably smaller than that of the
original gerrymandered plan, regardless of which partisan swing assumption is used to generate the
curves.
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(a) BG,U for the Original Pennsylvania Map
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(b) BG,V for the Original Pennsylvania Map
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(c) BG,U for the Redrawn Pennsylvania Map
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(d) BG,V for the Redrawn Pennsylvania Map
Figure 4.2: Comparison of the geometric bias measures for each Pennsylvania redistricting plan.
4.3.2 Outlier Analysis for Pennsylvania Maps
The initial values alone are enough for us to see that the original Pennsylvania map con-
sistently demonstrates more partisan bias than its redrawn 2018 counterpart when subjected to a
selection of partisan bias measures. But how do these maps compare under outlier analysis? Can
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the 2018 Pennsylvania map still be considered fair when compared to the sample of possible maps
that could have been drawn instead?
The results of the outlier analysis conducted would suggest that it can. If we consider a
map to be fair, then when we generate a large sample of typical districtings, we should expect to
observe many maps that have bias measures similar to ours. Correspondingly, if we assume that our
map is typical in the sense that it is drawn according to the uniform stationary distribution of the
Markov chain, the probability of observing a map exhibiting similar bias measures should not be so
small that it represents a very unlikely event. Thus, p-values resulting from the outlier analysis of
a fair districting should be consistently higher than those for a decided gerrymandered districting,
and this is indeed what we observe when comparing the opposing Pennsylvania redistricting plans.
Table 4.3 displays the results of the
√
ε test, with the p-values for the 2011 and 2018 Penn-
sylvania maps side-by-side under each partisan bias measure and for each set of relevant constraints.
For all but six of the 64 comparisons, the p-values for the redrawn 2018 map are larger than those of
the original legislature-drawn plan, indicating that the new plan is more typical with respect to ran-
domly drawn Congressional maps for Pennsylvania and less likely to have been intentionally crafted
with partisan intent. Highlighted cells represent p-values below the 0.001 threshold, and we see that
the
√
ε test achieves significance for far more instances of the 2011 map than it does for the 2018
map across all partisan bias measures, indicating that the original Pennsylvania map is an outlier
with respect to the sample of typical districtings. From this comparison, we can infer that, even
though a few specific conditions may result in significance, fair maps such as the remedial 2018 plan
will most often demonstrate overwhelming non-significance across multiple constraint combinations.
Note that, in some cases, the table reports p-values greater than one. Although this is
nonsensical from a probabilistic standpoint, it is interpretable in context of the
√
ε test. As defined
by Equation 2.16, a p-value greater than one corresponds to more than half of the sample maps
exhibiting as much bias as our original map.
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PA 2011 PA 2018 PA 2011 PA 2018 PA 2011 PA 2018 PA 2011 PA 2018
No 0.00005 0.31040 0.00207 0.06457 0.00850 0.06487 0.00007 0.00819
0.01
Yes 0.00023 0.00278 0.00051 0.00330 0.00795 0.11182 0.00003 0.00003
No 0.00002 0.30114 0.00100 0.06473 0.00805 0.06890 0.00003 0.00616
No
0.02
Yes 0.00001 0.00423 0.00156 0.00763 0.00794 0.11518 0.00001 0.00066
No 0.00039 0.66938 0.00540 0.29299 0.13528† 0.12463 0.00004 0.01077
0.01
Yes 0.00024 0.00613 0.00095 0.00435 0.13232† 0.11411 0.00003 0.00028





Yes 0.00009 0.00672 0.00135 0.00442 0.12095† 0.11447 0.00003 0.00040
No 0.00011 1.24750 0.17281 0.93685 0.12351 1.00430 0.00003 1.17700
0.01
Yes 0.00007 1.01280 0.10318 0.27867 0.12827 0.94898 0.00001 0.84303
No 0.00008 1.20990 0.18738 0.90883 0.12331 1.12520 0.00003 1.26020
No
0.02
Yes 0.00010 0.93730 0.09244 0.27541 0.12321 0.87924 0.00001 0.79592
No 0.00004 1.22950 0.06582 0.96476 0.12588 1.01310 0.00002 1.26420
0.01
Yes 0.00008 0.95192 0.06895 0.20674 0.12788† 0.11354 0.00005 0.01156




Yes 0.00008 0.92962 0.06058 0.20812 0.18365† 0.11337 0.00006 0.01583
Table 4.3: Resulting p-values from the
√
ε test for the PA Congressional maps. Highlighted p-values indicate significance at α = 0.001. A
dagger (†) denotes cases in which the p-value for the gerrymandered plan is greater than that of the remedial plan.
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Closer examination of the results shads light on how the different partisan bias measures
compare to one another as label functions for a given map. Median-mean, which is considered a
reliable indicator of partisan bias, achieves significance for all combinations of constraints shown
in Table 4.3. We can observe that BG,V likewise achieves significant p-values for all configurations
of traditional redistricting criteria. This indicates that BG,V is an alternative reliable indicator of
partisan bias that performs similarly to median-mean. On the other hand, for the biased 2011 map,
βˆ(V ) only detects significance for three of the 16 constraint combinations, while BG,U does not
indicate significance at all. This demonstrates that βˆ(V ) and BG,U are less sensitive to detecting
partisan bias under outlier analysis.
The poor performance of βˆ(V ) in comparison with median-mean is not necessarily unex-
pected. As mentioned in Subsection 4.1.1, the bias point estimate is a slow-changing function, its
value altered only when a sufficient number of precinct swaps have been made to shift a seat from
one party to another. From our results, we can see that it likely changes too slowly to be considered
sensitive to small changes in district boundaries, failing the second criterion of a good label function.
On the other hand, given the similarity of the seats-votes curves drawn under the UPS
and VPS assumptions, it is surprising that BG,U and BG,V show such drastically different levels
of sensitivity to partisan bias on the same map. A possible reason for the reduced sensitivity of
BG,U could be that assuming a uniform partisan swing removes an additional level of variability
in voter behavior from being taken into account when graphing the seats-votes curve. Allowing
the variable shifts in district-level voting outcomes through the VPS assumption may better reflect
hypothetical voting patterns and, as a result, produce a better estimate of bias through the BG,V
measure. However, further investigation is needed to fully understand this difference in performance.
In addition, it is worth reiterating that the geometric bias measure differs from median-mean
in that it is not a signed measure and thus does not indicate the direction of partisan bias. This
means that achieving significance using a geometric bias measure such as BG,V indicates that a small
proportion of the sample maps generated exhibited as or more partisan bias towards either party. In
contrast, significance under MM as the label function indicates that a small proportion of the maps
exhibited as or more bias against Democratic voters, but does not consider how biased any of the
sample maps are against Republican voters. One might argue that this quality makes the variable
geometric bias measure BG,V superior to that of median-mean in the assessment of election maps,
as it quantifies overall deviation from partisan symmetry and may relate more closely to the ideal
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of achieving districting plans that are fair for all constituents. However, in the context of bringing
a suspected gerrymander to court, it may be seen as advantageous to focus on the particular party
that is supposed to be disadvantaged by the districting plan in question.
An understanding of how the various bias measures perform as label functions on fair and
unfair maps informs how we proceed with the analysis of the 2011 South Carolina maps. If any
of the three maps exhibits extreme partisan bias, we should expect to see the
√
ε test produce p-
values below the significance threshold for all or the majority of relevant constraint combinations
with respect to MM and BG,V . On the other hand, if any of the maps does not indicate extreme
bias, while we may observe a few constraint combinations for which p < 0.001, the majority of the
p-values will indicate non-significance.
4.4 The Initial South Carolina Maps
With the results of the 2011 and 2018 Pennsylvania maps in mind, we proceed with an
initial look at the three South Carolina election maps analyzed in this thesis.
4.4.1 Estimated Seats-Votes Curve
The estimated seats-votes curves for the South Carolina maps are shown in Figure 4.3.
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Comparison of South Carolina Seats-Votes Curves 
 Under the Uniform Partisan Swing Assumption
S(V), SC Congressional Map
S(V), SC Senate Map
S(V), SC House Map
(a) Uniform Partisan Swing Assumption
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Comparison of South Carolina Seats-Votes Curves 
 Under the Variable Partisan Swing Assumption
S(V), SC Congressional Map
S(V), SC Senate Map
S(V), SC House Map
(b) Variable Partisan Swing Assumption
Figure 4.3: Comparison of the estimated seats-votes curves for the 2011 South Carolina election
maps, drawn under both the UPS and VPS assumptions.
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We can see that the graph of Ŝ(V ) for the South Carolina Congressional map, denoted with a black
line, is quite close to crossing through the (0.5, 0.5) midpoint, indicating that the map, at least at
first glance, does not exhibit gross deviation from partisan symmetry in the region immediately
around V = 0.5. It is noteworthy that the curve is rather steep under both assumptions, indicating
that it does not take a large shift in the statewide average district vote V to switch seats from one
party to the other. The seats-votes curves for the state Senate and House maps, which are nearly
identical to one another, appear slightly further to the right of the graphical midpoint and display
a more gradual relationship between V and the estimated seat share. All three maps, however, do
indicate some degree of partisan bias advantaging Republicans.
Overlaying the curves from both South Carolina and Pennsylvania on the same graph al-
lows us to further observe their similarities and differences. While Ŝ(V ) for the South Carolina
Congressional map bears much similarity to the curve for the 2018 Pennsylvania Congressional map
in roughly the 0.45 < V < 0.55 region, the South Carolina Senate and House maps more closely
resemble the 2011 Pennsylvania map in this same region. The South Carolina Congressional map
also deviates more starkly in the tail regions compared with the other four maps, while the state
Senate and House maps more closely align with what we observe in Pennsylvania. It is possible that
this is due, in part, to the small number of Congressional seats allotted to South Carolina, which
results in a less smooth curve.
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Comparison of PA and SC Seats-Votes Curves 
 Under the Uniform Partisan Swing Assumption
S(V), SC Congressional Map
S(V), SC Senate Map
S(V), SC House Map
S(V), 2011 PA Map
S(V), 2018 PA Map
(a) Uniform Partisan Swing Assumption
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Comparison of PA and SC Seats-Votes Curves 
 Under the Variable Partisan Swing Assumption
S(V), 2011 PA Map
S(V), 2018 PA Map
S(V), SC Congressional Map
S(V), SC Senate Map
S(V), SC House Map
(b) Variable Partisan Swing Assumption
Figure 4.4: Seats-votes curves for both Pennsylvania and South Carolina overlaid for comparison.
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4.4.2 Initial Bias Measures
Table 4.4 summarizes the initial values for each of the four label functions imposed on the
Congressional and legislative district maps in South Carolina, with measures from Pennsylvania
included for comparison.
Map MM βˆ(V ) BG,U BG,V
SC Congressional −0.0199 −0.1429 0.0479 0.0377
SC Senate −0.0494 −0.1087 0.0512 0.0392
SC House −0.0517 −0.1089 0.0568 0.0430
PA 2011 −0.0626 −0.2222 0.0942 0.0675
PA 2018 −0.0209 −0.1389 0.0525 0.0353
Table 4.4: Initial bias measure values for each of the three 2011 South Carolina election maps.
We can quickly observe that the original Pennsylvania map exhibits significantly more par-
tisan bias with respect to all four initial bias measures than any of the South Carolina maps. The
South Carolina Congressional map, in fact, has initial bias measures that are strikingly similar to
those of the fair remedial Pennsylvania plan, indicating even less bias from the standpoint of median-
mean, the bias point estimate, and geometric bias under the UPS assumption. The South Carolina
House and Senate maps, on the other hand, are a bit more variable, indicating less bias than all
the Congressional maps with respect to βˆ(V ), bias that more closely resembles the gerrymandered
Pennsylvania map with respect to MM, and similar degrees of bias for both BG,U and BG,V . The















































(b) Bias Point Estimate
Figure 4.5: Comparison of initial MM and βˆ(V ) for South Carolina and Pennsylvania.






















(a) Geometric Bias under UPS






















(b) Geometric Bias under VPS
Figure 4.6: Comparison of initial BG,U and BG,V for South Carolina and Pennsylvania.
The amount of partisan bias can again be emphasized visually by looking at the correspond-
ing graphs for BG,U and BG,V in Figure 4.7 and noting how the shaded areas compare to those in
Figure 4.2. The shaded area of the South Carolina Congressional map bears much resemblance in its
width and shape to that of the 2018 Pennsylvania plan. The state Senate and House maps appear
to be somewhere between the geometric bias measure graphs of the two Pennsylvania plans, but the
initial values of BG,U and BG,V reveal that the accumulated area between the seats-votes curve and
its inverse is relatively closer to that of the fair Pennsylvania plan.
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(a) BG,U for the SC Congressional Map
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South Carolina Congressional Map 




(b) BG,V for the SC Congressional Map
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South Carolina Senate Map 




(c) BG,U for the SC Senate Map
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South Carolina Senate Map 




(d) BG,V for the SC Senate Map
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South Carolina House Map 




(e) BG,U for the SC Senate Map
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South Carolina House Map 




(f) BG,V for the SC Senate Map
Figure 4.7: Comparison of the geometric bias measures for each South Carolina election map.
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Despite the similarity of the initial bias measures in South Carolina to those of 2018 Penn-
sylvania map, we again turn to outlier analysis to test the likelihood of gerrymandering. This is
necessary because state election maps carry several distinctive characteristics. For instance, when
considering the SC Congressional map, the shape of the state itself, the distribution of population
and voting preferences across precincts, and the fewer Congressional seats are all features in contrast
with those of Pennsylvania. These factors likely help determine the sample of all maps that can be
drawn in the state, so it is possible that, while MM = −0.0199 appears conservative compared to
Pennsylvania, the majority of Congressional maps you could draw for South Carolina exhibit even
less bias. Every electoral map will exhibit some inherent partisan bias, so it is most beneficial to
compare possible plans within a given state as opposed to comparing one state’s map to another.
4.5 Outlier Analysis Results for South Carolina
All constraint combinations under which the
√
ε test was performed were selected from those
described in Subsection 4.1.2 in accordance with the South Carolina Senate and House Judiciary
Committee Guidelines on redistricting [26, 45]. Both sets of guidelines require that districts be
compact in shape, so for each of the three South Carolina maps, both the perimeter threshold and
the inverse Polsby-Popper threshold were considered. Guidelines also require that communities of
interest be taken into account, so runs of the code were conducted with and without the require-
ment to preserve counties that are fully contained inside existing districts, and the SC Congressional
map was tested with and without freezing Congressional District 6, the minority-majority district
drawn in compliance with the Voting Rights Act. Lastly, both sets of guidelines impose a maximum
allowable percent deviation from population equality of districts, and the bounds on population
equality were chosen with respect to those specified in the documents. Results for reasonable alter-
native combinations of constraints are included in Appendix C, but the most relevant constraints
are presented in Tables 4.5–4.7.
One thing that we observe almost immediately is that the bias point estimate and geometric
bias under the UPS assumption do not achieve significance for any of the tested constraint combina-
tions, corroborating our evidence from the Pennsylvania maps that βˆ(V ) and BG,U do not perform
as reliably as indicators of partisan bias as do MM and BG,V . However, with the exception of one











MM βˆ(V ) BG,U BG,V
No 0.45312 0.11908 0.03790 0.01086
0.01
Yes 0.08114 0.60432 0.04132 0.00011
No 0.47728 0.10221 0.03773 0.01139
No
0.02
Yes 0.04133 0.46509 0.04401 0.00000
No 0.78627 1.32270 0.08286 0.05560
0.01
Yes 1.41420 1.41420 0.00332 0.00316





Yes 1.41350 1.41420 0.08432 0.07029
No 0.62437 0.06283 0.03720 0.00761
0.01
Yes 0.06836 0.72337 0.04004 0.00010
No 0.53587 0.06621 0.03455 0.00666
No
0.02
Yes 0.02984 0.48391 0.04485 0.00000
No 0.82927 1.27810 0.08393 0.04951
0.01
Yes 0.01034 1.41420 0.01195 0.01149




Yes 1.41420 1.41420 1.39930 1.39850
Table 4.5: Outlier analysis results for the South Carolina Congressional map. Highlighted p-values
indicate significance at α = 0.001.
significance for the vast majority of constraints imposed on the three maps. Given that median-mean
is an agreed-upon standard for detecting partisan bias, the overall lack of significant results indicates
that there is little evidence of gerrymandering in South Carolina. The geometric bias measure under
the VPS assumption does indicate bias for four of the constraint combinations imposed on the South
Carolina Congressional map, all of which have the county preservation requirement in common and
do not require the minority-majority district to be unchanged. However, given that these instances
only comprise a fraction of the possible constraint combinations, these four cases do not indicate
sufficient evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the South Carolina Congressional









MM βˆ(V ) BG,U BG,V
No 0.00612 0.08274 0.11096 0.00471Inverse
Polsby-Popper
0.05
Yes 0.00620 0.08815 0.09939 0.00506
No 0.00749 0.08081 0.10423 0.00459
Perimeter 0.05
Yes 0.00095 0.05906 0.08331 0.00174
Table 4.6: Outlier analysis results for the South Carolina Senate map. Highlighted p-values indicate












No 0.03802 1.30550 0.56883 0.46723
Yes 0.02701 1.39880 0.90689 1.13480
Perimeter 0.025
No 0.03822 1.22670 0.50180 0.35868
Yes 0.00833 1.39500 0.65659 0.43324
Table 4.7: Outlier analysis results for the South Carolina House map. Highlighted p-values indicate
significance at α = 0.001.
4.6 Summary of Analysis
The results of this analysis provide us with several insights into the utilization of partisan
bias measures and outlier analysis as a diagnostic for partisan gerrymandering. We observe that the
√
ε test on non-gerrymandered maps yields higher p-values than those resulting from significantly
biased maps, indicating that a relatively large proportion of sample maps generated have bias mea-
sure values at least as extreme as the original map in question. These p-values typically fall outside
reasonable significance thresholds used in hypothesis testing.
We also observe that certain partisan bias measures are more sensitive to detecting partisan
bias than others. Median-mean and geometric bias under the VPS assumption perform consistently
as indicators of partisan bias, while the bias point estimate and geometric bias under the UPS
assumption are not sensitive enough to changes in districtings to perform well as label functions.
Using these insights to inform the analysis of the South Carolina Congressional, state Senate,





The research presented in this thesis bears relevance both to the current context in which
it takes place and to the future work to be done in the area of election map analysis. This chapter
presents a contextualization of the results, limitations of this analysis, implications for the use of
such methods, and directions for future work.
5.1 Contextualizing the Results
Based on the initial bias measure values for the South Carolina maps, we can see that there
is some natural bias exhibited by the election maps as indicated by negative values of MM and βˆ(V )
and positive values of BG,U and BG,V . South Carolina is a historically “red” state, where Democratic
voters tend to cluster in urban centers and Republican voters tend to be spread out in rural areas,
which contributes to the natural bias in favor of Republicans that we observe. However, the fact
that the
√
ε test should suggest that South Carolina is not gerrymandered despite nonzero initial
partisan bias measure values may not necessarily be surprising. Recall from Section 1.3 that the
federal preclearance requirement for legislature-drawn election maps was in place when the 2011 maps
were drawn, even though it has since been rendered unenforceable. This preclearance requirement
was initially a provision to keep states in compliant with the Voting Rights Act by incorporating an
extra measure to prevent racially discriminatory districting plans. The Democratic voting tendencies
of racial minority citizens is well-documented in research, showing that in the last forty years, both
African-American and Hispanic voters have tended to support Democratic candidates [31, 38]. This
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correlation may shed light on the impact of the federal preclearance requirement on the partisan
bias of election maps; in other words, maps that fairly represent minority voters are likely to also
be fair with respect to partisan symmetry.
5.2 Limitations of This Project
One key limitation of this analysis — and of gerrymandering detection methods in general —
is that both the partisan bias measures discussed and methods of outlier analysis currently available
assume a two-party system. This seems to work reasonably well in some cases; for example, only
a modest 1.72% of the votes cast in the 2010 gubernatorial race chosen as a proxy for the South
Carolina analysis were for third-party candidates, making an assumed two-party system appropriate.
However, this assumption is limiting and perhaps oversimplifies voting behavior.
An additional limitation is the time required to perform outlier analysis in this manner.
The C++ code used to simulate the Markov chain and perform the
√
ε test can take a relatively
long time to run and requires uninterrupted computing time. The runtime varies not only with
the number of steps taken along the chain, but also with the computational complexity of the bias
measure(s) chosen, the constraints imposed on the map, and the number of precincts and election
districts in the map. For instance, the code producing outlier analysis results for the South Carolina
Congressional map ran from 2–400 hours, while that for the state Senate map ran from 150–950
hours (see Appendix D for a complete summary of runtimes). Some of the code for the state House
map under certain constraints even exceeded the maximum runtime of 1440 hours, or sixty days,
allotted on the Palmetto Cluster and terminated shortly after completing 235 steps along the chain.
The amount of time and resources required to run the analysis presents a challenge for assessing
proposed election maps proactively before they are established in an electoral system.
These methods provide a useful way to identify extremely biased maps but cannot be utilized
to generate samples from the stationary distribution of possible maps [22]. It is also worth mentioning
that there are specific instances, though presumably rare, under which the
√
ε test could yield results
that do not fully reflect how unusual a districting is with respect to the sample of possible districtings.
One distinction of Chikina et al.’s approach is that it tests a map’s status as a local outlier as opposed
to a global one. While this is powerful, as it does not require knowledge about the mixing time of
the Markov chain, problems could arise for chains with disconnected state spaces. A disconnected
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state space may occur if, for example, the bounds on population inequality are restrictive enough
to prevent precinct swaps that are required to access other reasonable districtings. Such chains will
never mix, and though the
√
ε test still applies, it can only report on the outlier status of the map
with respect to the other possible maps generated from the portion of the state space it traverses.
Cho and Rubinstein-Salzedo demonstrate two examples of this phenomenon, one in which a map is
identified as a local outlier but is not a global outlier with respect to all possible maps [24].
Despite these limitations, there is still strong rationale behind using the
√
ε test. The
application of a global outlier test would assume that mapmakers construct gerrymandered maps by
identifying a map which is a global optimum with respect to its measure of bias. However, Chikina
et al. point out that solving such a problem is highly inefficient; if formulated as a planar-graph
partitioning problem, the identification of a map that is a global optimum with respect to partisan
bias is NP-hard [23]. Further, the state space of all feasible maps against which the gerrymandered
map is an outlier is extremely complicated, and it follows that the enumeration of this state space
that would be required to identify the gerrymandered map as a global outlier is #P-hard (read
“number-P hard”) [28]. In practicality, rather than attempting to solve this global optimization
problem, it is more reasonable that mapmakers will search for local optimum by starting with a map
and making iterative changes to increase the degree of partisan bias in their party’s favor until it can
no longer be significantly improved. Local outlier tests such as the
√
ε test are rigorous alternatives
to global outlier techniques that still get at the heart of gerrymandering claims and more closely
mirror a plausible way in which a gerrymander might be constructed. The test by Chikina et al.
identifies cases in which the partisan bias of a map quickly falls apart as the map is modified along
the Markov chain, indicating the precise and careful crafting of district boundaries that is exhibited
by gerrymandered maps.
Lastly, the usefulness of this approach for assessing election maps from a legal standpoint
is still up for debate. Making an informed decision about how to use the results of this approach
requires some degree of mathematical understanding, which could create a barrier to its use as a legal
standard by which to evaluate the likelihood of gerrymandering. In the end, it is up to state courts
to decide whether significant results from the
√




Outlier analysis is one of the most rigorous, feasible, and mathematically sound methods
of analyzing a map for the likelihood of partisan gerrymandering. As such, it carries implications
for practice. One such implication is the necessity that researchers utilizing such an approach take
time to understand what the results can and cannot say about the likelihood of partisan intent in
the design of election maps. A second and perhaps more crucial implication is the ethical use of
the diagnostic. The fact that there are different acceptable partisan bias measures that all indicate
asymmetry in the seats-votes curve, but perform differently with respect to outlier analysis, could
lead someone trying to demonstrate the fairness of a map to use a less-sensitive label function such
as βˆ(V ) to achieve non-significant results and argue that it passes the
√
ε test and is thus unbiased,
when in reality the map might demonstrate overwhelming bias with respect to another label function.
Chikina et al. acknowledge the gravity of this concern, emphasizing that “care must be taken to
choose a ‘canonical’ label function ω, so that there is no concern that ω was carefully crafted” in
response to the original map [22]. Given that median-mean has historical usage as an indicator
of partisan bias, is similarly recognized as such by modern scholarship, and has been successfully
utilized as a label function for this test in a court of law through LWV v. PA, any measure of partisan
asymmetry used as a label function should demonstrate results that are similar to those produced
by median-mean, such as BG,V .
5.4 Future Work
There is much left to be done as a continuation of this project. One area for future work
is to further investigate why certain bias measures perform differently from one another as label
functions. Of particular interest is the differences between the geometric bias measure BG under
both the uniform and variable partisan swing assumptions. As hypothesized in Chapter 4, it is
suspected that the differing degrees of partisan voting shifts across districts that are accounted for
by the VPS assumption provides an extra dimension for estimating voter behavior that is lost by
the UPS assumption, making it a more accurate indicator of partisan bias.
In future work, the algorithm for computing geometric bias in the C++ code will be adjusted
to correspond to the directionality we see in other measures of partisan asymmetry with respect to
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∣∣∣Ŝ(v)− Ŝ−1(v)∣∣∣ dv if Ŝ(0.5) < 0.5,
(5.1)
where negative values of BG indicate a Republican advantage. Doing so would be advantageous from
the standpoint of achieving additional transparency and clarity in the use of partisan bias measures
as label functions of the Markov chain.
Also of interest is how the
√
ε test of outlier analysis compares with the simulation approach
developed by Chen and Rodden with respect to the label functions used in this analysis [20]. In
practice, approaches to quantify the effects of gerrymandering rarely stand on their own; for example,
both Chen and Rodden’s approach and that of Chikina et al. were used to argue for the redrawing
of the Pennsylvania Congressional map [6]. It would be valuable to see how these methods compare
to one another and whether the results are consistent for South Carolina maps. Also, because the
simulation algorithm for generating sample maps is distinct from the Markov chain approach, this
method may generate additional sample maps that are not part of the state space visited by the
chain, which could help mitigate the problem posed by Cho and Rubinstein-Salzedo in which the
state space is disconnected and viable maps are not considered in the
√
ε test. Incorporating both
approaches to outlier analysis would produce an even more comprehensive and rigorous analysis.
Given the significant runtime required for this analysis, it is natural to question whether
the
√
ε test can be performed more efficiently. One direction to explore is the option of running
instances of the Markov chain in parallel to generate the same number of sample maps in a fraction
of the time. The C++ code provided by Pegden has an option for doing so, but it is not immediately
clear how the theory presented in the PNAS paper by Chikina et al. corresponds to this method;
more precisely, it is not directly stated how running multiple chains in parallel from the same initial
state X0 alters the upper bound on the probability that X0 is an outlier. Care would need to be
taken to understand how simulating multiple trajectories from the initial state affects the analysis
results. Another direction would be to analyze whether the number of steps required for the chain
to achieve a stable significance level can be reduced. This question arises from the behavior of the
chain that was observed in this analysis. For the results in Chapter 4, the p-value at a given point
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of the chain was plotted against the number of steps taken at that point. In many cases, the p-
values become stable within 235 steps, after which the significance level does not change drastically
regardless of how many additional sample maps are generated (e.g., Subfigures 5.1a and 5.1c). In a
few instances, however, the p-values bounce around for the first several billion steps, then steadily
increase (Subfigure 5.1b) or decrease (Subfigure 5.1d). It would be valuable to further analyze these
results to investigate whether there is a set of conditions under which running the chain for a shorter
period of time is sufficient to achieve a reliable level of significance. Doing so could shave orders of
magnitude off the runtime and increase the practicality of the approach.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 5.1: Semi-log plots (base 2) of p-values vs. steps taken along the Markov chain for BG,V on
the SC House map.
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As noted in this thesis, a characteristic that sets the South Carolina Congressional map apart
from that of Pennsylvania, but is by no means unique, is its small number of Congressional districts.
Future work should be dedicated to further exploring the question of how having few districts in an
election map may affect the
√
ε test. It takes a greater number of precinct shifts to actually flip a
Congressional seat from one party to another for a state with a few districts versus many, and it is
suspected that this could affect the sensitivity of the analysis with respect to certain label functions.
The following experiment is proposed to test the hypothesis that partisan bias measures of election
maps become less sensitive to gerrymandering in states with fewer election districts.
1. Overlay South Carolina with a grid of squares. For each square:
 Assign 0 if it does not overlap with SC.
 Assign 1 if it does overlap with SC.
2. Eliminate squares with a value of zero. We will be left with a grid version of South Carolina.
(Ideally, the number of squares will approximately equal the number of precincts in SC.)
3. Calculate the percent overlap of each precinct with each grid square.
4. Using the observed values from the underlying South Carolina map, assign a population,
Democratic votes, and Republican votes to each grid square proportionally by area.
5. For each grid square, randomly generate an election outcome.
 Let Di be a random variable representing the number of Democratic votes cast in square i.
 Di ∼ Binom(ni, pi), where ni is the number of voters in square i and pi is the probability
that a single voter in square i votes for a Democratic candidate.
 Estimate pi using pˆi, the observed proportion of Democratic votes in square i.
 ni ≥ 30 for all voting precincts; thus, by the Central Limit Theorem, Di ∼ Ni (nipi, nipi (1− pi)).
 Generate a random draw DOi from the distribution of Di.
 The simulated proportion of Democratic votes cast in square i is now DOi ni.
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6. For each randomly generated election, calculate the seats won and the value of each bias
measure under several different districting plans imposed on the grid map. These districting
plans may be generated using:
 Chikina et al.’s Markov chain method [22],
 Chen and Rodden’s simulation method [20], or
 Some alternative method.
7. Scale both the population of South Carolina and the number of grid squares by enough to
allow for one additional Congressional seat. Repeat the experiment.
This process would be repeated a finite number of times until the map has been tested with a
reasonably large number of seats in the electorate. For example, iterations could be performed
until the map population had been scaled up to roughly correspond to fifty-three Congressional
districts; this would be a reasonable place to terminate the experiment, as it is the largest number of
Congressional seats apportioned to a given state in the 2010 redistricting cycle, held by California.
The last, but perhaps most important, area of future work mentioned in this thesis is the
application of these results and insights to the upcoming redistricting cycle. The 2020 Census
and subsequent redistricting process are just around the corner, and new election maps will be
proposed that will govern each state’s electoral system for the next ten years. Hopefully, the insights
gained by this study will be utilized to assist in the process of assessing proposed districting plans,
ultimately helping to establish electoral systems that fairly represent their constituents and uphold




Appendix A Markov Chain Used for Outlier Analysis
A formal description of the Markov chain used for outlier analysis is presented in this
appendix, building on the description of the transition probabilities in Chikina et al. and drawing
on principles of Markov chain theory [22, 46, 51].
Let M = X0, X1, . . . be a Markov chain on state space Σ = {i0, i1, . . . , ik−1, i, j}, where Σ
represents the set of all possible districtings. Also let Nmax > 0 be the theoretical maximum number
of possible transitions from any state in Σ. The transition probabilities from state i to state j, for
any i, j ∈ Σ, are defined as follows:
1. Let Si be the set of all valid transitions from state i, which is the set of all pairs (p,D), where p
is a precinct in district Dp and D 6= Dp is a district adjacent to precinct p. Let NSi = |Si| > 0
be the size of this set.




3. Choose one pair (p0, D0) ∈ Si uniformly at random; that is, with probability 1NSi .
4. Transition to state j by changing the district membership of p0 from Dp0 to D0 if the resulting
districting falls within the constraints imposed on the election maps. If not, remain in the
current state.
Note that the probability of transitioning from state i to state j for any i 6= j is
pi,j = P (continue ∩ swap)















1− NSiNmax for i = j, corresponds to remaining in state i,
1
Nmax
for i 6= j, j corresponds to valid transition, and
0 otherwise.
(A.1)
The construction of the transition matrix yields several properties of the chain.
Proposition 1. M converges to a stationary distribution pi.
Proof. Nmax is chosen such that Nmax > NSi for all i, making the diagonal entries of P to be
pi,i = 1− NSiNmax > 0. Thus some power of the transition matrix P has all positive entries; that is,
for some n ≥ 1, we have that pni,j > 0 for all i, j. By definition, the Markov chain M is regular,
implying that it converges to a stationary distribution pi.
Proposition 2. The stationary distribution pi is unique.
Proof. Because M is regular, all states in Σ communicate and thus M is irreducible, which implies
that the stationary distribution pi is unique.
Proposition 3. The stationary distribution pi is uniform.
Proof. Note the following properties of M:
 The state space Σ of the Markov chain is finite. (Even though the number of possible district-
ings is enormous, there is a finite number of possible ways to draw the district boundary lines
when doing so using precinct swaps.)
 Because the diagonal elements of P are strictly positive (pi,i > 0), M is aperiodic.
 P is symmetric by construction.
76
In addition, note that the sum of row i of P is
∑
j












and by the symmetry of P, the columns also sum to one. Thus, M is doubly stochastic.
Because M is finite, irreducible, aperiodic, and doubly stochastic, the stationary distribution pi is
uniform with pii =
1
|Σ| for all i.
Proposition 4. M is reversible.
Proof. The symmetry of P and uniform stationary distribution pi imply that
piipi,j = pijpj,i for all i, j,
and thus M is reversible and the √ε test applies.
In application, it is nearly impossible to observe the theory above with actual election
maps because the state space Σ of all possible districtings is enormous. For illustration purposes, a
simplified example of the Markov chain described in this appendix is presented below.
Consider a square region with two districts — a purple district P and a blue district B —
which are each allocated two equally sized precincts, denoted p1, . . . , p4. The original districting of
the region can be represented as shown.
p1 p3
p2 p4
Figure A.1: An example of a region with two election districts and four precincts.
Each of the cells in Figure A.2 on the following page represents a possible districting in
the state space Σ, taking into account the restriction that precincts touching at a point are not
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considered contiguous. For each state i, the set of possible transitions Si and the size of that set
NSi are included.







S0 = {(p1, B), (p2, B), (p3, P ), (p4, P )} S1 = {(p1, P ), (p4, P )} S2 = {(p2, P ), (p3, P )}
NS0 = 4 NS1 = 2 NS2 = 2







S3 = {(p2, B), (p3, B)} S4 = {(p1, B), (p4, B)} S5 = {(p1, P ), (p2, B), (p3, P ), (p4, B)}
NS3 = 2 NS4 = 2 NS5 = 4







S6 = {(p1, B), (p2, P ), (p3, B), (p4, P )} S7 = {(p2, P ), (p3, P )} S8 = {(p2, B), (p3, B)}
NS6 = 4 NS7 = 2 NS8 = 2







S9 = {(p1, P ), (p4, B)} S10 = {(p1, B), (p4, B)} S11 = {(p1, P ), (p2, P ), (p3, B), (p4, B)}
NS9 = 2 NS10 = 2 NS11 = 4
Figure A.2: All possible states, or valid districtings, for the example election map in Figure A.1.
The graph of allowable transitions between the above states (districtings) is shown in Fig-









Figure A.3: A graph showing possible transitions between the states enumerated in Figure A.2.
We choose Nmax to be the possible number of total configurations of precincts between the
two districts, which is (number of precincts) × (number of districts) = 4 × 2 = 8. This ensures
that Nmax > NSi for all i, as we know that this number includes invalid districtings that violate
the contiguity principle. Then, using the construction of the chain defined by Chikina et al. and
described above, the resulting probability transition matrix P can be written as follows.
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
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0 1/2 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8
1 1/8 3/4 1/8
2 1/8 3/4 1/8
3 1/8 3/4 1/8
4 1/8 3/4 1/8
5 1/8 1/8 1/2 1/8 1/8
6 1/8 1/8 1/2 1/8 1/8
7 1/8 3/4 1/8
8 1/8 3/4 1/8
9 1/8 3/4 1/8
10 1/8 3/4 1/8
11 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/2

With this relatively small example, we can observe the convergence of the chain to its sta-
tionary distribution. To do so, the probability transition matrix P was entered into MatLab R2018b.
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P = [.500 .125 .125 .125 .125 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00;
.125 .750 0.00 0.00 0.00 .125 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00;
.125 0.00 .750 0.00 0.00 0.00 .125 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00;
.125 0.00 0.00 .750 0.00 0.00 .125 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00;
.125 0.00 0.00 0.00 .750 .125 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00;
0.00 .125 0.00 0.00 .125 .500 0.00 .125 .125 0.00 0.00 0.00;
0.00 0.00 .125 .125 0.00 0.00 .500 0.00 0.00 .125 .125 0.00;
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .125 0.00 .750 0.00 0.00 0.00 .125;
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .125 0.00 0.00 .750 0.00 0.00 .125;
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .125 0.00 0.00 .750 0.00 .125;
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .125 0.00 0.00 0.00 .750 .125;
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .125 .125 .125 .125 .500]
Successive powers of P were then computed to observe the chain’s behavior. After four
steps, one can observe that all entries of the transition matrix are positive, showing that P is indeed
a regular Markov chain.
.1973 .1563 .1563 .1563 .1563 .0684 .0684 .0098 .0098 .0098 .0098 .0020
.1563 .4033 .0439 .0439 .0869 .1563 .0098 .0439 .0439 .0010 .0010 .0098
.1563 .0439 .4033 .0869 .0439 .0098 .1563 .0010 .0010 .0439 .0439 .0098
.1563 .0439 .0869 .4033 .0439 .0098 .1563 .0010 .0010 .0439 .0439 .0098
.1563 .0869 .0439 .0439 .4033 .1563 .0098 .0439 .0439 .0010 .0010 .0098
.0684 .1563 .0098 .0098 .1563 .1973 .0020 .1563 .1563 .0098 .0098 .0684
.0684 .0098 .1563 .1563 .0098 .0020 .1973 .0098 .0098 .1563 .1563 .0684
.0098 .0439 .0010 .0010 .0439 .1563 .0098 .4033 .0869 .0439 .0439 .1563
.0098 .0439 .0010 .0010 .0439 .1563 .0098 .0869 .4033 .0439 .0439 .1563
.0098 .0010 .0439 .0439 .0010 .0098 .1563 .0439 .0439 .4033 .0869 .1563
.0098 .0010 .0439 .0439 .0010 .0098 .1563 .0439 .0439 .0869 .4033 .1563
.0020 .0098 .0098 .0098 .0098 .0684 .0684 .1563 .1563 .1563 .1563 .1973
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The mixing time for this chain is 93 steps, at which one can observe that all entries of P93
are equal, at least to the precision of four decimal places.
.0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833
.0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833
.0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833
.0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833
.0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833
.0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833
.0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833
.0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833
.0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833
.0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833
.0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833
.0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833 .0833





























indicating that the long-run proportion of time the Markov chain will spend in a given state is the
same for any districting, and thus all possible maps in the state space are given equal weight.
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Appendix B Explanation of the Chikina et al. Proof
This appendix is a supplement to the proof of the theorem in Chikina et al. used to define
the
√
ε test [22]. It is merely an effort to assist the reader in understanding the proof by providing
additional detail. We first begin with two key definitions.
Definition 1. A real number α0 is an ε-outlier among α0, α1, . . . , αk if there are, at most, ε(k+ 1)
indices i for which αi ≤ α0.
Definition 2. σj is `-small among σ0, σ1, . . . , σk if there are, at most, ` indices i 6= j among 0, . . . , k
such that the label of σi is, at most, the label of σj .
Following from these definitions, note that for a Markov chain X0, X1, X2, . . . on the state space
i0, i1, . . . , ik ∈ Σ with real-valued label function ω : Σ→ R, the following are equivalent:
(a) The label of X0 is an ε-outlier among the labels for X0, X1, . . . , Xk.
(b) X0 is bε(k + 1)− 1c-small among X0, X1, . . . , Xk.
We now proceed with the statement of the theorem proposed in the text by Chikina et al.
Theorem 1. Let M = X0, X1, . . . be a reversible Markov chain with a stationary distribution pi
and state space Σ, and suppose the states of M have real-valued labels defined by ω : Σ → R. If
X0 ∼ pi, then for any fixed k, the probability that the label of X0 is an ε-outlier among the list of
labels observed in the trajectory X0, X1, . . . , Xk is, at most,
√
2ε. [22]
Proof. Let pi denote any stationary distribution for M and suppose that the initial state X0 is
distributed X0 ∼ pi, so that Xs ∼ pi for all s. For 0 ≤ j ≤ k and state i ∈ Σ, we define the following
probabilities:
ρkj,` := P (Xj is `-small among X0, . . . , Xk) (B.1)
and
ρkj,`(i) := P (Xj is `-small among X0, . . . , Xk |Xj = i) . (B.2)
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Observe that, because Xs ∼ pi for all s, we also have that
ρkj,`(i) = P (Xs+j is `-small among Xs, . . . , Xs+k |Xs+j = i) . (B.3)
Note the following observations.
Observation 1: ρkj,`(i) = ρ
k
k−j,`(i).
Proof. Because M = X0, X1, . . . is stationary (with all Xs’s having the same distribution) and
reversible,
P ((X0, . . . , Xk) = (i0, . . . , ik)) = P ((X0, . . . , Xk) = (ik, . . . , i0))
for any fixed sequence of states (i0, . . . , ik).
Thus, for 0 ≤ j ≤ k, any sequence (i0, . . . , ik) for which ij = i and ij is `-small corresponds to
an equiprobable sequence (ik, . . . , i0) for which ik−j = i and ik−j is `-small. That is,
P (Xj is `-small among X0, . . . , Xk |Xj = i) = P (Xk−j is `-small among X0, . . . , Xk |Xk−j = i).
∴ ρkj,`(i) = ρkk−j,`(i).
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Observation 2: ρkj,2`(i) = ρ
j
j,`(i) · ρk−j0,` (i).
Proof. Consider the events that Xj is `-small among X0, . . . , Xj and among Xj , . . . , Xk. Note
that the two events are conditionally independent when conditioning on Xj = i.
The probability of the first event, by definition from Equation B.1, is ρjj,l(i).
If we consider ρk−j0,` (i) and apply the definition from Equation B.2, we have that
ρk−j0,` (i) = P (Xs is `-small among Xs, . . . , Xs+k−j |Xs = i)
(let s=j)
= P (Xj is `-small among Xj , . . . , Xk|Xj = i) ,
which is the probability of the second event.
Finally, the probability of both events occurring is the probability that Xj is 2`-small among
X0, . . . , Xk; that is,
P (Xj is 2`-small among X0, . . . , Xk) = ρ
k
j,2`.
∴ ρkj,2`(i) = ρ
j









where the first equality follows from Observation 2, the second equality from Observation 1, and the
inequality from the fact that ρkj,`(i) is monotone non-increasing in k for a fixed j, `, and i.




, where expectation is taken





] ≥ E [(ρk0,`(i))2] ≥ (E [ρk0,`(i)])2 = (ρk0,`)2 , (B.5)
where the second inequality follows from Cauchy-Schwarz.
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For 0 ≤ j ≤ k, let ξj be the indicator variable defined to be 1 whenever Xj is 2`-small among
X0, . . . , Xk and 0 otherwise. Then there are at most 2`+ 1 2`-small terms; that is,
k∑
j=0
ξj ≤ 2`+ 1. (B.7)










 ≤ E [2`+ 1] = 2`+ 1, (B.8)
where the second equality follows from the linearity of expectation, and the inequality follows from
Equation B.7. Combining Equations B.6 and B.8, we have
2`+ 1 ≥ (k + 1) (ρk0,`)2 , (B.9)






Using the equivalent Definitions 1 and 2, we have that ` = bε(k + 1)− 1c ≤ ε(k + 1)− 1, and thus
2`+ 1 ≤ 2ε(k + 1)− 1 ≤ 2ε(k + 1). (B.11)
















Appendix C Outlier Analysis Results
The tables included in this appendix summarize the results of the outlier analysis for the
five maps considered in this thesis. For each map, separate tables are included for each bias measure,
and each row of a given table represents the results obtained from one run of the chain under the
specified constraints. The initial value of the given bias measure for the map under analysis is
included in the header of each table. The tables contain the following pieces of information.
 Compactness Threshold. Specifies whether a threshold on the maximum allowable compactness
score was imposed and, if so, whether the Inverse Polsby-Popper (Equation 4.1) or Perimeter
(Equation 4.2) threshold was used. For maps that use one of these thresholds, the initial
compactness score of the map was calculated and the threshold set to be between 2% and
4% higher than this initial score. This threshold value is denoted beneath the constraint in
the tables. Note that some threshold values (such as the Perimeter thresholds for the South
Carolina maps) are much larger than others. This does not necessarily indicate that these
maps show extreme violations of compactness compared to the others; rather, this is a result
of the different geographic units used for each map. Maps for which no bounds on compactness
were set have this constraint labeled as None.
 Freeze District. Specifies whether a minority-majority district was frozen to prevent swap-
ping precincts to or from that district. This applies only to Congressional plans that have a
designated minority-majority district drawn in compliance with the Voting Rights Act.
 Population Threshold. Specifies the maximum allowable proportion difference between any
two districts for a given districting. Precincts that violate this condition if swapped between
districts cannot be selected.
 Preserve Counties. Specifies whether counties fully contained in districts were left unchanged.
If so, precincts residing in such counties cannot be chosen for district membership swaps.
 Mean. The Markov chain code prints output every 222 steps, providing information about a
subsample of maps and allowing one to observe the behavior of the chain. Mean designates
the average bias measure value of the generated subsample. The subsample size n is specified
in each table; if n is denoted with an asterisk (∗), it indicates that some of the rows contain
descriptive statistics for up to seven fewer sample maps due to an issue with the output file.
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 Std. Dev. Reports the standard deviation of the bias measure values from the subsample.
 More Biased Maps. The number of maps observed in the full sample of maps generated that
contain a bias measure value more extreme than that of the original map.
 Total Steps. Total number of steps taken by the chain, equal to the number of sample maps
generated.
 ε. Proportion of maps more biased than the original map. Also denotes the value of ε for
which the original districting is an ε-outlier (see Definition 1).
 p-value. Probability of observing a map as biased as the original map with respect to a given
bias measure under the assumption that the original map is among the population of “typical”
districtings. Where a p-value is shown as being greater than one, recall that the p-value is
an upper bound on significance by Theorem 1 and is computed according to Equation 2.16
as p =
√
2ε. Thus, this result indicates that ε > 0.5, or more than half the generated maps
exhibited bias as “extreme” as the current map. Values which fall below the designated
significance level of α = 0.001 are highlighted in each table.
Additional constraint combinations are included in this appendix that were not presented
in the main results section of Chapter 4. The results presented in the main body of the thesis
are those most relevant to the redistricting guidelines per state. For example, both Pennsylvania
and South Carolina guidelines require that election districts be relatively compact, so it is most
reasonable to consider cases where compactness is constrained in some manner. Similarly, guidelines
for South Carolina legislative districts specify explicit bounds on the percent population difference
between districts, so considering alternative population thresholds is not as insightful as considering
those that are in place for the redistricting process. However, in order to be fully transparent in my
analysis, all of the results are included here.
Note that some of the alternative constraint combinations presented achieve significance,
whereas those most closely corresponding to the appropriate redistricting guidelines did not. This
does not, however, alter the conclusion drawn that there is little evidence of partisan gerrymandering
in South Carolina. For this conclusion to change, we would need to observe significance across all
or most constraints with respect to reliable label functions (namely, median-mean and variable
geometric bias as shown in Chapter 4), as we do with the original Pennsylvania gerrymander.
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No −0.010753 0.006645 1,178 1,099,511,627,780 1.0714 · 10−9 4.6290 · 10−5
0.01
Yes −0.022661 0.005486 30,256 1,099,511,627,785 2.7518 · 10−8 2.3460 · 10−4
No −0.009799 0.006656 184 1,099,511,627,778 1.6735 · 10−10 1.8295 · 10−5
No
0.02
Yes −0.020540 0.006004 35 1,099,511,627,778 3.1832 · 10−11 7.9790 · 10−6
No −0.011643 0.006818 85,771 1,099,511,627,776 7.8008 · 10−8 3.9499 · 10−4
0.01
Yes −0.021909 0.005408 30,574 1,099,511,627,778 2.7807 · 10−8 2.3583 · 10−4






Yes −0.019244 0.005314 4,917 1,099,511,627,784 4.4720 · 10−9 9.4573 · 10−5
No −0.026474 0.007850 7,113 1,099,511,627,776 6.4692 · 10−9 1.1375 · 10−4
0.01
Yes −0.037286 0.005455 2,563 1,099,511,627,785 2.3310 · 10−9 6.8279 · 10−5
No −0.027507 0.007481 3,094 1,099,511,627,777 2.8140 · 10−9 7.5020 · 10−5
No
0.02
Yes −0.037553 0.004510 5,147 1,099,511,627,778 4.6812 · 10−9 9.6759 · 10−5
No −0.025329 0.007399 923 1,099,511,627,781 8.3946 · 10−10 4.0975 · 10−5
0.01
Yes −0.031154 0.005834 3,424 1,099,511,627,788 3.1141 · 10−9 7.8919 · 10−5





Yes −0.034267 0.004464 3,786 1,099,511,627,799 3.4433 · 10−9 8.2986 · 10−5
No −0.024193 0.010118 64,856,749 1,099,511,627,779 5.8987 · 10−5 1.0862 · 10−2
0.01
Yes −0.032384 0.008652 18,785,792 1,099,511,627,776 1.7086 · 10−5 5.8456 · 10−3
No −0.024304 0.010126 65,919,843 1,099,511,627,780 5.9954 · 10−5 1.0950 · 10−2
No
0.02
Yes −0.020617 0.007916 1,424 1,099,511,627,777 1.2951 · 10−9 5.0894 · 10−5
No −0.023276 0.009677 34,637,487 1,099,511,627,777 3.1503 · 10−5 7.9376 · 10−3
0.01
Yes −0.030281 0.008921 2,844,294 1,099,511,627,778 2.5869 · 10−6 2.2746 · 10−3




Yes −0.029265 0.009164 2,312,871 1,099,511,627,780 2.1035 · 10−6 2.0511 · 10−3
Table C.1: Results for median-mean on the 2011 Pennsylvania Congressional map.
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Constraints Results for 2011 Pennsylvania Congressional Map
(





















No −0.050555 0.028815 2,357,386 1,099,511,627,780 2.1440 · 10−6 2.0708 · 10−3
0.01
Yes −0.082152 0.016324 142,187 1,099,511,627,785 1.2932 · 10−7 5.0856 · 10−4
No −0.046622 0.028534 546,988 1,099,511,627,778 4.9748 · 10−7 9.9748 · 10−4
No
0.02
Yes −0.067890 0.024085 1,330,742 1,099,511,627,778 1.2103 · 10−6 1.5558 · 10−3
No −0.064557 0.033745 16,047,408 1,099,511,627,776 1.4595 · 10−5 5.4028 · 10−3
0.01
Yes −0.079477 0.022059 492,347 1,099,511,627,778 4.4779 · 10−7 9.4635 · 10−4






Yes −0.075510 0.022596 998,237 1,099,511,627,784 9.0789 · 10−7 1.3475 · 10−3
No −0.131809 0.035877 16,417,691,532 1,099,511,627,776 1.4932 · 10−2 1.7281 · 10−1
0.01
Yes −0.162808 0.016155 5,852,728,860 1,099,511,627,785 5.3230 · 10−3 1.0318 · 10−1
No −0.137191 0.035134 19,303,122,154 1,099,511,627,777 1.7556 · 10−2 1.8738 · 10−1
No
0.02
Yes −0.165181 0.013499 4,697,878,928 1,099,511,627,778 4.2727 · 10−3 9.2441 · 10−2
No −0.121356 0.030022 2,381,993,384 1,099,511,627,781 2.1664 · 10−3 6.5824 · 10−2
0.01
Yes −0.142810 0.024013 2,613,684,916 1,099,511,627,788 2.3771 · 10−3 6.8951 · 10−2





Yes −0.153585 0.017776 2,017,511,233 1,099,511,627,799 1.8349 · 10−3 6.0579 · 10−2
No −0.108277 0.041623 8,200,737,487 1,099,511,627,779 7.4585 · 10−3 1.2214 · 10−1
0.01
Yes −0.125426 0.027172 1,125,332,126 1,099,511,627,776 1.0235 · 10−3 4.5243 · 10−2
No −0.108859 0.041895 8,495,220,874 1,099,511,627,780 7.7264 · 10−3 1.2431 · 10−1
No
0.02
Yes −0.098252 0.032885 260,215,841 1,099,511,627,777 2.3666 · 10−4 2.1756 · 10−2
No −0.106383 0.039148 5,224,267,756 1,099,511,627,777 4.7514 · 10−3 9.7483 · 10−2
0.01
Yes −0.117258 0.027017 302,986,744 1,099,511,627,778 2.7556 · 10−4 2.3476 · 10−2




Yes −0.117946 0.028002 551,763,460 1,099,511,627,780 5.0183 · 10−4 3.1680 · 10−2
Table C.2: Results for the bias point estimate on the 2011 Pennsylvania Congressional map.
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No 0.014850 0.004952 9,935,538 274,877,906,944 3.6145 · 10−5 8.5024 · 10−3
Yes 0.026151 0.004501 8,696,292 274,877,906,947 3.1637 · 10−5 7.9545 · 10−3
0.02
No 0.013698 0.004605 8,900,567 274,877,906,944 3.2380 · 10−5 8.0474 · 10−3
Yes 0.026355 0.004563 8,657,757 274,877,906,951 3.1497 · 10−5 7.9368 · 10−3
Yes
0.01
No 0.040663 0.008505 2,515,393,543 274,877,906,947 9.1509 · 10−3 1.3528 · 10−1
Yes 0.044942 0.008496 2,406,321,020 274,877,906,949 8.7541 · 10−3 1.3232 · 10−1
0.02
No 0.040956 0.008875 2,520,172,043 274,877,906,944 9.1683 · 10−3 1.3541 · 10−1





No 0.054479 0.009530 2,096,627,572 274,877,906,948 7.6275 · 10−3 1.2351 · 10−1
Yes 0.066825 0.008991 2,261,378,600 274,877,906,948 8.2268 · 10−3 1.2827 · 10−1
0.02
No 0.053882 0.012365 2,089,936,881 274,877,906,944 7.6031 · 10−3 1.2331 · 10−1
Yes 0.067622 0.009319 2,086,379,354 274,877,906,951 7.5902 · 10−3 1.2321 · 10−1
Yes
0.01
No 0.056195 0.009043 2,177,958,035 274,877,906,946 7.9234 · 10−3 1.2588 · 10−1
Yes 0.060296 0.008499 2,247,427,989 274,877,906,953 8.1761 · 10−3 1.2788 · 10−1
0.02
No 0.056684 0.009470 2,198,782,056 274,877,906,945 7.9991 · 10−3 1.2648 · 10−1




No 0.049738 0.012076 1,649,719,156 274,877,906,946 6.0016 · 10−3 1.0956 · 10−1
Yes 0.056945 0.010229 1,468,035,062 274,877,906,951 5.3407 · 10−3 1.0335 · 10−1
0.02
No 0.050667 0.012129 1,718,190,812 274,877,906,944 6.2507 · 10−3 1.1181 · 10−1
Yes 0.056222 0.011537 2,519,756,482 274,877,906,946 9.1668 · 10−3 1.3540 · 10−1
Yes
0.01
No 0.052586 0.009655 2,298,396,244 274,877,906,944 8.3615 · 10−3 1.2932 · 10−1
Yes 0.055119 0.007994 1,675,356,760 274,877,906,945 6.0949 · 10−3 1.1041 · 10−1
0.02
No 0.052877 0.009795 2,284,621,942 274,877,906,944 8.3114 · 10−3 1.2893 · 10−1
Yes 0.055613 0.008122 1,693,627,761 274,877,906,952 6.1614 · 10−3 1.1101 · 10−1
Table C.3: Results for uniform geometric bias on the 2011 Pennsylvania Congressional map.
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No 0.012261 0.003001 747 274,877,906,944 2.7176 · 10−9 7.3723 · 10−5
0.01
Yes 0.021338 0.002424 111 274,877,906,947 4.0382 · 10−10 2.8419 · 10−5
No 0.011362 0.002626 94 274,877,906,944 3.4197 · 10−10 2.6152 · 10−5
No
0.02
Yes 0.021389 0.002597 26 274,877,906,951 9.4587 · 10−11 1.3754 · 10−5
No 0.025191 0.002007 233 274,877,906,947 8.4765 · 10−10 4.1174 · 10−5
0.01
Yes 0.028607 0.002195 126 274,877,906,949 4.5839 · 10−10 3.0278 · 10−5






Yes 0.029502 0.001874 126 274,877,906,945 4.5839 · 10−10 3.0278 · 10−5
No 0.038489 0.004864 118 274,877,906,948 4.2928 · 10−10 2.9301 · 10−5
0.01
Yes 0.046974 0.004724 26 274,877,906,948 9.4587 · 10−11 1.3754 · 10−5
No 0.038017 0.004655 91 274,877,906,944 3.3106 · 10−10 2.5732 · 10−5
No
0.02
Yes 0.047373 0.004852 26 274,877,906,951 9.4587 · 10−11 1.3754 · 10−5
No 0.038279 0.004249 71 274,877,906,946 2.5830 · 10−10 2.2729 · 10−5
0.01
Yes 0.041941 0.003636 389 274,877,906,953 1.4152 · 10−9 5.3201 · 10−5





Yes 0.041004 0.003205 427 274,877,906,945 1.5534 · 10−9 5.5739 · 10−5
No 0.035568 0.007668 92 274,877,906,946 3.3469 · 10−10 2.5873 · 10−5
0.01
Yes 0.040255 0.006116 26 274,877,906,951 9.4587 · 10−11 1.3754 · 10−5
No 0.036107 0.007558 10,411 274,877,906,944 3.7875 · 10−8 2.7523 · 10−4
No
0.02
Yes 0.038894 0.006728 26 274,877,906,946 9.4587 · 10−11 1.3754 · 10−5
No 0.035393 0.004635 199 274,877,906,944 7.2396 · 10−10 3.8051 · 10−5
0.01
Yes 0.037465 0.003723 130 274,877,906,945 4.7294 · 10−10 3.0755 · 10−5




Yes 0.037947 0.003892 130 274,877,906,952 4.7294 · 10−10 3.0755 · 10−5
Table C.4: Results for variable geometric bias on the 2011 Pennsylvania Congressional map.
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No −0.010186 0.006717 52,967,254,374 1,099,511,627,777 4.8173 · 10−2 3.1040 · 10−1
Yes −0.009919 0.002282 4,237,150 1,099,511,627,792 3.8537 · 10−6 2.7762 · 10−3
0.02
No −0.010479 0.006314 49,856,217,351 1,099,511,627,780 4.5344 · 10−2 3.0114 · 10−1
Yes −0.009480 0.002284 9,858,133 1,099,511,627,795 8.9659 · 10−6 4.2346 · 10−3
Yes
0.01
No −0.015529 0.007383 246,330,104,691 1,099,511,627,776 2.2404 · 10−1 6.6938 · 10−1
Yes −0.008085 0.004540 20,666,430 1,099,511,627,776 1.8796 · 10−5 6.1312 · 10−3
0.02
No −0.015123 0.007819 246,382,899,657 1,099,511,627,776 2.2408 · 10−1 6.6945 · 10−1





No −0.026606 0.007215 855,616,172,608 1,099,511,627,786 7.7818 · 10−1 1.2475
Yes −0.021446 0.004618 563,901,344,853 1,099,511,627,777 5.1287 · 10−1 1.0128
0.02
No −0.025710 0.007528 804,754,958,677 1,099,511,627,777 7.3192 · 10−1 1.2099
Yes −0.020504 0.004692 482,979,471,740 1,099,511,627,783 4.3927 · 10−1 9.3730 · 10−1
Yes
0.01
No −0.025990 0.007145 831,022,950,237 1,099,511,627,782 7.5581 · 10−1 1.2295
Yes −0.019873 0.005917 498,162,176,507 1,099,511,627,780 4.5308 · 10−1 9.5192 · 10−1
0.02
No −0.024810 0.007524 757,561,256,622 1,099,511,627,776 6.8900 · 10−1 1.1739




No −0.023227 0.009987 646,994,513,737 1,099,511,627,779 5.8844 · 10−1 1.0848
Yes −0.019184 0.004949 353,901,192,411 1,099,511,627,778 3.2187 · 10−1 8.0234 · 10−1
0.02
No −0.023330 0.009971 649,990,164,971 1,099,511,627,776 5.9116 · 10−1 1.0873
Yes −0.019411 0.004876 366,784,283,247 1,099,511,627,776 3.3359 · 10−1 8.1681 · 10−1
Yes
0.01
No −0.024086 0.009383 684,826,865,663 1,099,511,627,776 6.2285 · 10−1 1.1161
Yes -0.017052 0.006243 252,882,650,404 1,099,511,627,776 2.3000 · 10−1 6.7823 · 10−1
0.02
No −0.024208 0.009339 691,441,909,943 1,099,511,627,776 6.2886 · 10−1 1.1215
Yes −0.017587 0.006077 274,982,904,607 1,099,511,627,779 2.5010 · 10−1 7.0724 · 10−1
Table C.5: Results for median-mean on the 2018 Pennsylvania Congressional map.
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No −0.051486 0.029453 2,292,141,143 1,099,511,627,777 2.0847 · 10−3 6.4571 · 10−2
Yes −0.007071 0.022508 5,985,899 1,099,511,627,792 5.4441 · 10−6 3.2997 · 10−3
0.02
No −0.053097 0.028211 2,303,390,815 1,099,511,627,780 2.0949 · 10−3 6.4729 · 10−2
Yes −0.003718 0.021712 31,973,281 1,099,511,627,795 2.9080 · 10−5 7.6262 · 10−3
Yes
0.01
No −0.071806 0.033911 47,194,164,820 1,099,511,627,776 4.2923 · 10−2 2.9299 · 10−1
Yes −0.034954 0.023407 10,405,579 1,099,511,627,776 9.4638 · 10−6 4.3506 · 10−3
0.02
No −0.070800 0.035637 50,782,368,893 1,099,511,627,776 4.6186 · 10−2 3.0393 · 10−1





No −0.140446 0.032024 482,516,271,814 1,099,511,627,786 4.3885 · 10−1 9.3685 · 10−1
Yes −0.096015 0.023944 42,691,801,277 1,099,511,627,777 3.8828 · 10−2 2.7867 · 10−1
0.02
No −0.136770 0.033632 454,087,845,326 1,099,511,627,777 4.1299 · 10−1 9.0883 · 10−1
Yes −0.093477 0.024953 41,699,023,566 1,099,511,627,783 3.7925 · 10−2 2.7541 · 10−1
Yes
0.01
No −0.141995 0.031477 511,696,714,973 1,099,511,627,782 4.6539 · 10−1 9.6476 · 10−1
Yes −0.082871 0.029131 23,497,605,989 1,099,511,627,780 2.1371 · 10−2 2.0674 · 10−1
0.02
No −0.135526 0.032737 434,713,050,957 1,099,511,627,776 3.9537 · 10−1 8.8923 · 10−1




No −0.107445 0.042127 258,490,881,786 1,099,511,627,779 2.3510 · 10−1 6.8571 · 10−1
Yes −0.079843 0.028863 37,485,070,175 1,099,511,627,778 3.4092 · 10−2 2.6112 · 10−1
0.02
No −0.108019 0.041558 261,809,480,282 1,099,511,627,776 2.3811 · 10−1 6.9009 · 10−1
Yes −0.081029 0.029168 41,111,414,969 1,099,511,627,776 3.7391 · 10−2 2.7346 · 10−1
Yes
0.01
No −0.118074 0.041629 363,956,190,414 1,099,511,627,776 3.3102 · 10−1 8.1365 · 10−1
Yes −0.060814 0.029859 6,487,287,117 1,099,511,627,776 5.9002 · 10−3 1.0863 · 10−1
0.02
No −0.118489 0.041673 367,038,960,002 1,099,511,627,776 3.3382 · 10−1 8.1709 · 10−1
Yes −0.064198 0.029804 10,134,670,811 1,099,511,627,779 9.2174 · 10−3 1.3578 · 10−1
Table C.6: Results for the bias point estimate on the 2018 Pennsylvania Congressional map.
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No 0.015307 0.029216 578,293,049 274,877,906,944 2.1038 · 10−3 6.4866 · 10−2
Yes 0.013908 0.004530 1,718,476,520 274,877,906,944 6.2518 · 10−3 1.1182 · 10−1
0.02
No 0.014860 0.008156 652,406,673 274,877,906,944 2.3734 · 10−3 6.8898 · 10−2
Yes 0.014540 0.005098 1,823,287,965 274,877,906,944 6.6331 · 10−3 1.1518 · 10−1
Yes
0.01
No 0.019902 0.005963 2,134,665,993 274,877,906,944 7.7659 · 10−3 1.2463 · 10−1
Yes 0.016502 0.005353 1,789,731,356 274,877,906,957 6.5110 · 10−3 1.1411 · 10−1
0.02
No 0.020359 0.006252 2,136,869,807 274,877,906,946 7.7739 · 10−3 1.2469 · 10−1





No 0.053434 0.009804 138,631,329,650 274,877,906,945 5.0434 · 10−1 1.0043
Yes 0.050072 0.011066 123,773,391,193 274,877,906,944 4.5028 · 10−1 9.4898 · 10−1
0.02
No 0.055705 0.009549 174,006,607,879 274,877,906,944 6.3303 · 10−1 1.1252
Yes 0.048402 0.028266 106,247,762,045 274,877,906,948 3.8653 · 10−1 8.7924 · 10−1
Yes
0.01
No 0.053595 0.007931 141,049,873,754 274,877,906,949 5.1314 · 10−1 1.0131
Yes 0.037124 0.009544 1,771,703,806 274,877,906,955 6.4454 · 10−3 1.1354 · 10−1
0.02
No 0.055209 0.007913 176,141,537,680 274,877,906,946 6.4080 · 10−1 1.1321




No 0.049820 0.012290 110,736,493,418 274,877,906,944 4.0286 · 10−1 8.9762 · 10−1
Yes 0.050231 0.011825 120,831,018,509 274,877,906,945 4.3958 · 10−1 9.3764 · 10−1
0.02
No 0.050036 0.012192 112,541,449,522 274,877,906,946 4.0942 · 10−1 9.0490 · 10−1
Yes 0.050783 0.011532 126,402,243,947 274,877,906,946 4.5985 · 10−1 9.5901 · 10−1
Yes
0.01
No 0.052841 0.010797 142,938,271,326 274,877,906,944 5.2001 · 10−1 1.0198
Yes 0.038339 0.009368 2,721,929,147 274,877,906,957 9.9023 · 10−3 1.4073 · 10−1
0.02
No 0.053312 0.011098 146,801,602,043 274,877,906,944 5.3406 · 10−1 1.0335
Yes 0.039883 0.009249 2,238,901,187 274,877,906,946 8.1451 · 10−3 1.2763 · 10−1
Table C.7: Results for uniform geometric bias on the 2018 Pennsylvania Congressional map.
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No 0.012615 0.003125 9,212,610 274,877,906,944 3.3515 · 10−5 8.1872 · 10−3
0.01
Yes 0.010947 0.001442 116 274,877,906,944 4.2201 · 10−10 2.9052 · 10−5
No 0.012361 0.002981 5,213,600 274,877,906,944 1.8967 · 10−5 6.1591 · 10−3
No
0.02
Yes 0.011352 0.002001 60,625 274,877,906,944 2.2055 · 10−7 6.6416 · 10−4
No 0.014993 0.003720 15,951,006 274,877,906,944 5.8029 · 10−5 1.0773 · 10−2
0.01
Yes 0.011870 0.002283 11,035 274,877,906,957 4.0145 · 10−8 2.8336 · 10−4






Yes 0.011787 0.002308 21,781 274,877,906,954 7.9239 · 10−8 3.9809 · 10−4
No 0.037702 0.004884 190,411,706,710 274,877,906,945 6.9271 · 10−1 1.1770
0.01
Yes 0.032429 0.005609 97,678,034,705 274,877,906,944 3.5535 · 10−1 8.4303 · 10−1
No 0.039063 0.005052 218,257,945,981 274,877,906,944 7.9402 · 10−1 1.2602
No
0.02
Yes 0.031573 0.005915 87,065,256,391 274,877,906,948 3.1674 · 10−1 7.9592 · 10−1
No 0.038547 0.004150 219,660,268,074 274,877,906,949 7.9912 · 10−1 1.2642
0.01
Yes 0.025835 0.005817 18,368,714 274,877,906,955 6.6825 · 10−5 1.1561 · 10−2





Yes 0.024902 0.005513 34,451,923 274,877,906,947 1.2534 · 10−4 1.5833 · 10−2
No 0.035499 0.007726 145,114,561,032 274,877,906,944 5.2792 · 10−1 1.0275
0.01
Yes 0.032618 0.006386 105,626,747,368 274,877,906,945 3.8427 · 10−1 8.7666 · 10−1
No 0.035627 0.007600 147,856,173,116 274,877,906,946 5.3790 · 10−1 1.0372
No
0.02
Yes 0.032985 0.006246 110,832,763,218 274,877,906,946 4.0321 · 10−1 8.9801 · 10−1
No 0.038008 0.007043 183,521,246,637 274,877,906,944 6.6765 · 10−1 1.1555
0.01
Yes 0.026508 0.005909 6,854,107,460 274,877,906,957 2.4935 · 10−2 2.2332 · 10−1




Yes 0.027329 0.005733 4,537,254,986 274,877,906,946 1.6506 · 10−2 1.8169 · 10−1
Table C.8: Results for variable geometric bias on the 2018 Pennsylvania Congressional map.
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No −0.004624 0.011929 112,874,694,676 1,099,511,627,776 1.0266 · 10−1 4.5312 · 10−1
0.01
Yes −0.005589 0.004556 3,619,158,136 1,099,511,627,779 3.2916 · 10−3 8.1137 · 10−2
No −0.005797 0.011821 125,234,856,890 1,099,511,627,777 1.1390 · 10−1 4.7728 · 10−1
No
0.02
Yes −0.003364 0.005212 939,002,839 1,099,511,627,779 8.5402 · 10−4 4.1328 · 10−2
No −0.017644 0.004585 339,866,208,378 1,099,511,627,792 3.0911 · 10−1 7.8627 · 10−1
0.01
Yes −0.020261 0.000190 1,099,506,052,118 1,099,511,627,803 9.9999 · 10−1 1.4142






Yes −0.028061 0.000597 1,098,403,610,397 1,099,511,627,868 9.9899 · 10−1 1.4135
No −0.010339 0.011058 214,318,260,194 1,099,511,627,780 1.9492 · 10−1 6.2437 · 10−1
0.01
Yes −0.006019 0.004490 2,568,913,571 1,099,511,627,776 2.3364 · 10−3 6.8358 · 10−2
No −0.008541 0.010756 157,867,195,774 1,099,511,627,781 1.4358 · 10−1 5.3587 · 10−1
No
0.02
Yes −0.002959 0.005424 489,663,278 1,099,511,627,832 4.4535 · 10−4 2.9844 · 10−2
No −0.018175 0.003934 378,063,310,870 1,099,511,627,779 3.4385 · 10−1 8.2927 · 10−1
0.01
Yes −0.018483 0.000019 58,796,879 1,099,511,627,949 5.3475 · 10−5 1.0342 · 10−2





Yes −0.027883 0.000104 1,099,438,764,341 1,099,511,627,787 9.9993 · 10−1 1.4142
No −0.002004 0.014921 135,059,770,113 1,099,511,627,778 1.2284 · 10−1 4.9565 · 10−1
0.01
Yes 0.003913 0.002656 1,118 1,099,511,627,780 1.0168 · 10−9 4.5096 · 10−5
No −0.001974 0.015086 137,468,204,225 1,099,511,627,777 1.2503 · 10−1 5.0005 · 10−1
No
0.02
Yes 0.005272 0.005351 45,547 1,099,511,627,783 4.1425 · 10−8 2.8784 · 10−4
No −0.031792 0.011712 916,260,341,429 1,099,511,627,781 8.3333 · 10−1 1.2910
0.01
Yes −0.028360 0.000305 1,099,188,244,755 1,099,511,627,826 9.9971 · 10−1 1.4140




Yes −0.027367 0.002175 1,061,343,186,365 1,099,511,627,782 9.6529 · 10−1 1.3895
Table C.9: Results for median-mean on the 2011 South Carolina Congressional map.
97
Constraints Results for 2011 South Carolina Congressional Map
(


























No −0.020802 0.058487 7,796,018,771 1,099,511,627,776 7.0904 · 10−3 1.1908 · 10−1
Yes −0.078602 0.036288 200,772,511,931 1,099,511,627,779 1.8260 · 10−1 6.0432 · 10−1
0.02
No −0.021421 0.058504 5,743,063,295 1,099,511,627,777 5.2233 · 10−3 1.0221 · 10−1
Yes −0.071025 0.033773 118,916,600,790 1,099,511,627,779 1.0815 · 10−1 4.6509 · 10−1
Yes
0.01
No −0.144014 0.036724 961,888,223,467 1,099,511,627,792 8.7483 · 10−1 1.3227
Yes −0.142860 0.000000 1,099,511,627,803 1,099,511,627,803 1.0000 1.4142
0.02
No −0.144973 0.037146 965,886,921,644 1,099,511,627,808 8.7847 · 10−1 1.3255





No −0.039797 0.057405 2,170,017,838 1,099,511,627,780 1.9736 · 10−3 6.2827 · 10−2
Yes −0.086305 0.037286 287,666,674,657 1,099,511,627,776 2.6163 · 10−1 7.2337 · 10−1
0.02
No −0.028887 0.057170 2,409,782,350 1,099,511,627,781 2.1917 · 10−3 6.6207 · 10−2
Yes −0.073686 0.032150 128,734,494,508 1,099,511,627,832 1.1708 · 10−1 4.8391 · 10−1
Yes
0.01
No −0.137394 0.038051 898,017,460,318 1,099,511,627,779 8.1674 · 10−1 1.2781
Yes −0.142860 0.000140 1,099,511,627,949 1,099,511,627,949 1.0000 1.4142
0.02
No −0.138394 0.038051 906,616,451,593 1,099,511,627,826 8.2456 · 10−1 1.2842




No −0.007590 0.059593 9,200,272,177 1,099,511,627,778 8.3676 · 10−3 1.2936 · 10−1
Yes −0.068768 0.013693 140,086,449 1,099,511,627,780 1.2741 · 10−4 1.5963 · 10−2
0.02
No −0.007928 0.059758 8,744,357,753 1,099,511,627,777 7.9529 · 10−3 1.2612 · 10−1
Yes −0.063449 0.022980 179,787,608 1,099,511,627,783 1.6352 · 10−4 1.8084 · 10−2
Yes
0.01
No −0.161979 0.044525 561,360,440,111 1,099,511,627,781 5.1055 · 10−1 1.0105
Yes −0.214269 0.001224 1,099,511,627,826 1,099,511,627,826 1.0000 1.4142
0.02
No −0.164304 0.044520 583,351,903,190 1,099,511,627,781 5.3056 · 10−1 1.0301
Yes −0.211755 0.013217 1,099,511,627,782 1,099,511,627,782 1.0000 1.4142
Table C.10: Results for the bias point estimate on the 2011 South Carolina Congressional map.
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No 0.014067 0.006244 197,450,221 274,877,906,949 7.1832 · 10−4 3.7903 · 10−2
Yes 0.014494 0.003799 234,663,904 274,877,906,954 8.5370 · 10−4 4.1321 · 10−2
0.02
No 0.014178 0.007469 195,643,246 274,877,906,944 7.1175 · 10−4 3.7729 · 10−2
Yes 0.012428 0.003685 266,211,238 274,877,906,948 9.6847 · 10−4 4.4011 · 10−2
Yes
0.01
No 0.036391 0.005241 943,655,225 274,877,906,946 3.4330 · 10−3 8.2861 · 10−2
Yes 0.042379 0.000029 1,512,471 274,877,906,975 5.5023 · 10−6 3.3173 · 10−3
0.02
No 0.036422 0.005298 1,015,558,306 274,877,906,951 3.6946 · 10−3 8.5960 · 10−2





No 0.014990 0.006659 190,238,670 274,877,906,945 6.9208 · 10−4 3.7204 · 10−2
Yes 0.014193 0.003886 220,302,254 274,877,906,950 8.0145 · 10−4 4.0036 · 10−2
0.02
No 0.013799 0.006215 164,051,784 274,877,906,945 5.9682 · 10−4 3.4549 · 10−2
Yes 0.012529 0.003608 276,460,772 274,877,906,951 1.0058 · 10−3 4.4850 · 10−2
Yes
0.01
No 0.036754 0.006031 968,231,730 274,877,906,956 3.5224 · 10−3 8.3933 · 10−2
Yes 0.043193 0.000067 19,624,525 274,877,907,107 7.1394 · 10−5 1.1949 · 10−2
0.02
No 0.036552 0.005527 763,615,342 274,877,906,952 2.7780 · 10−3 7.4539 · 10−2




No 0.013445 0.006101 217,001,177 274,877,906,944 7.8945 · 10−4 3.9735 · 10−2
Yes 0.013440 0.003183 341,896,067 274,877,906,944 1.2438 · 10−3 4.9876 · 10−2
0.02
No 0.013482 0.006104 216,226,672 274,877,906,950 7.8663 · 10−4 3.9664 · 10−2
Yes 0.014591 0.003273 448,121,175 274,877,906,945 1.6303 · 10−3 5.7101 · 10−2
Yes
0.01
No 0.042446 0.005941 23,811,435,854 274,877,906,949 8.6625 · 10−2 4.1623 · 10−1
Yes 0.046351 0.000244 836,105,254 274,877,906,951 3.0417 · 10−3 7.7997 · 10−2
0.02
No 0.042479 0.005777 25,159,689,969 274,877,906,945 9.1530 · 10−2 4.2786 · 10−1
Yes 0.046182 0.005042 76,943,979,602 274,877,906,967 2.7992 · 10−1 7.4823 · 10−1
Table C.11: Results for uniform geometric bias on the 2011 South Carolina Congressional map.
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No 0.013360 0.004936 16,216,922 274,877,906,949 5.8997 · 10−5 1.0862 · 10−2
0.01
Yes 0.011831 0.002646 1,542 274,877,906,954 5.6098 · 10−9 1.0592 · 10−4
No 0.013475 0.004964 17,833,046 274,877,906,944 6.4876 · 10−5 1.1391 · 10−2
No
0.02
Yes 0.010448 0.002417 1 274,877,906,948 3.6380 · 10−12 2.6974 · 10−6
No 0.028526 0.003054 424,896,069 274,877,906,946 1.5458 · 10−3 5.5601 · 10−2
0.01
Yes 0.033353 0.000025 1,368,942 274,877,906,975 4.9802 · 10−6 3.1560 · 10−3






Yes 0.035240 0.000879 679,115,406 274,877,906,954 2.4706 · 10−3 7.0294 · 10−2
No 0.014146 0.005224 7,966,515 274,877,906,945 2.8982 · 10−5 7.6134 · 10−3
0.01
Yes 0.011542 0.002728 1,382 274,877,906,950 5.0277 · 10−9 1.0028 · 10−4
No 0.013202 0.004854 6,104,455 274,877,906,945 2.2208 · 10−5 6.6645 · 10−3
No
0.02
Yes 0.010527 0.002377 1 274,877,906,951 3.6380 · 10−12 2.6974 · 10−6
No 0.028810 0.003042 336,924,004 274,877,906,956 1.2257 · 10−3 4.9512 · 10−2
0.01
Yes 0.034053 0.000051 18,154,572 274,877,907,107 6.6046 · 10−5 1.1493 · 10−2





Yes 0.038025 0.000600 268,785,517,944 274,877,907,026 9.7784 · 10−1 1.3985
No 0.012598 0.004636 6,706,853 274,877,906,944 2.4399 · 10−5 6.9856 · 10−3
0.01
Yes 0.011830 0.002154 1,519 274,877,906,944 5.5261 · 10−9 1.0513 · 10−4
No 0.012642 0.004628 6,244,621 274,877,906,950 2.2718 · 10−5 6.7406 · 10−3
No
0.02
Yes 0.012941 0.002294 1 274,877,906,945 3.6380 · 10−12 2.6974 · 10−6
No 0.032070 0.003547 13,127,221,652 274,877,906,949 4.7757 · 10−2 3.0905 · 10−1
0.01
Yes 0.036137 0.000190 646,393,947 274,877,906,951 2.3516 · 10−3 6.8579 · 10−2




Yes 0.035900 0.001813 52,290,404,320 274,877,906,967 1.9023 · 10−1 6.1682 · 10−1
Table C.12: Results for variable geometric bias on the 2011 South Carolina Congressional map.
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No −0.018175 0.009236 34,133,033 274,877,906,944 1.2418 · 10−4 1.5759 · 10−2
0.025
Yes −0.021208 0.009685 199,478,542 274,877,906,944 7.2570 · 10−4 3.8097 · 10−2




Yes −0.013549 0.008720 5,280,342 274,877,906,948 1.9210 · 10−5 6.1984 · 10−3
No −0.019121 0.009125 41,427,080 274,877,906,945 1.5071 · 10−4 1.7361 · 10−2
0.025
Yes −0.023671 0.009120 306,702,744 274,877,906,945 1.1158 · 10−3 4.7239 · 10−2




Yes −0.009379 0.007610 123,793 274,877,906,951 4.5036 · 10−7 9.4906 · 10−4
No −0.018580 0.008987 29,037,567 274,877,906,949 1.0564 · 10−4 1.4535 · 10−2
0.025
Yes −0.016481 0.008708 13,865,040 274,877,906,945 5.0441 · 10−5 1.0044 · 10−2
No −0.014944 0.008689 3,185,469 274,877,906,944 1.1589 · 10−5 4.8143 · 10−3
None
0.05
Yes −0.015231 0.008422 6,199,148 274,877,906,945 2.2552 · 10−5 6.7160 · 10−3
Table C.13: Results for median-mean on the 2011 South Carolina Senate map.
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Constraints Results for 2011 South Carolina Senate Map
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No −0.049333 0.020621 1,335,703,937 274,877,906,944 4.8593 · 10−3 9.8583 · 10−2
Yes −0.060612 0.020322 4,518,459,280 274,877,906,944 1.6438 · 10−2 1.8132 · 10−1
0.05
No −0.043003 0.022548 940,812,946 274,877,906,945 3.4227 · 10−3 8.2736 · 10−2




No −0.051029 0.020372 1,337,239,000 274,877,906,945 4.8648 · 10−3 9.8639 · 10−2
Yes −0.065016 0.019819 6,692,114,624 274,877,906,945 2.4346 · 10−2 2.2066 · 10−1
0.05
No −0.043866 0.022206 897,419,139 274,877,906,949 3.2648 · 10−3 8.0806 · 10−2
Yes −0.039035 0.021996 479,367,434 274,877,906,951 1.7439 · 10−3 5.9058 · 10−2
None
0.025
No −0.053910 0.021897 3,086,404,084 274,877,906,949 1.1228 · 10−2 1.4986 · 10−1
Yes −0.049433 0.021058 1,203,197,953 274,877,906,945 4.3772 · 10−3 9.3565 · 10−2
0.05
No −0.048037 0.023123 2,112,518,652 274,877,906,944 7.6853 · 10−3 1.2398 · 10−1
Yes −0.049685 0.022444 2,229,741,933 274,877,906,945 8.1118 · 10−3 1.2737 · 10−1
Table C.14: Results for the bias point estimate on the 2011 South Carolina Senate map.
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No 0.026618 0.007527 1,556,774,314 137,438,953,472 1.1327 · 10−2 1.5051 · 10−1
Yes 0.030446 0.007666 3,106,943,411 137,438,953,477 2.2606 · 10−2 2.1263 · 10−1
0.05
No 0.023761 0.007298 846,012,462 137,438,953,475 6.1556 · 10−3 1.1096 · 10−1




No 0.026592 0.007592 1,502,399,347 137,438,953,476 1.0931 · 10−2 1.4786 · 10−1
Yes 0.030286 0.007613 2,961,001,808 137,438,953,476 2.1544 · 10−2 2.0758 · 10−1
0.05
No 0.023118 0.007371 746,506,370 137,438,953,474 5.4315 · 10−3 1.0423 · 10−1
Yes 0.021305 0.008370 476,966,310 137,438,953,475 3.4704 · 10−3 8.3311 · 10−2
None
0.025
No 0.026689 0.007734 1,658,826,816 137,438,953,472 1.2070 · 10−2 1.5537 · 10−1
Yes 0.026169 0.007687 1,506,281,967 137,438,953,475 1.0960 · 10−2 1.4805 · 10−1
0.05
No 0.023808 0.007675 863,189,795 137,438,953,472 6.2805 · 10−3 1.1208 · 10−1
Yes 0.024073 0.007788 958,524,548 137,438,953,473 6.9742 · 10−3 1.1810 · 10−1
Table C.15: Results for uniform geometric bias on the 2011 South Carolina Senate map.
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No 0.019840 0.004551 6,329,248 137,438,953,472 4.6051 · 10−5 9.5970 · 10−3
Yes 0.023095 0.004749 37,902,656 137,438,953,477 2.7578 · 10−4 2.3485 · 10−2
0.05
No 0.017437 0.004538 1,527,297 137,438,953,475 1.1113 · 10−5 4.7144 · 10−3




No 0.020138 0.004646 7,298,820 137,438,953,476 5.3106 · 10−5 1.0306 · 10−2
Yes 0.023444 0.004725 42,291,932 137,438,953,476 3.0771 · 10−4 2.4808 · 10−2
0.05
No 0.017341 0.004650 1,450,551 137,438,953,474 1.0554 · 10−5 4.5944 · 10−3
Yes 0.015874 0.004450 207,228 137,438,953,475 1.5078 · 10−6 1.7365 · 10−3
None
0.025
No 0.020153 0.004854 12,848,485 137,438,953,472 9.3485 · 10−5 1.3674 · 10−2
Yes 0.019522 0.004674 2,046,503 137,438,953,475 1.4890 · 10−5 5.4572 · 10−3
0.05
No 0.017976 0.004834 3,573,081 137,438,953,472 2.5998 · 10−5 7.2108 · 10−3
Yes 0.018407 0.005034 7,001,800 137,438,953,473 5.0945 · 10−5 1.0094 · 10−2
Table C.16: Results for variable geometric bias on the 2011 South Carolina Senate map.
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No −0.045681 0.003158 198,618,606 274,877,906,946 7.2257 · 10−4 3.8015 · 10−2
0.025
Yes −0.046506 0.002526 100,271,835 274,877,906,944 3.6479 · 10−4 2.7011 · 10−2




Yes −0.027355 0.006349 2,656,279 274,877,906,945 9.6635 · 10−6 4.3962 · 10−3
No −0.045204 0.003172 200,782,922 274,877,906,945 7.3044 · 10−4 3.8222 · 10−2
0.025
Yes −0.045630 0.001999 9,547,089 274,877,906,945 3.4732 · 10−5 8.3345 · 10−3




Yes −0.024050 0.006738 203,352 274,877,906,944 7.3979 · 10−7 1.2164 · 10−3
No −0.042430 0.003120 212,402,059 274,877,906,945 7.7271 · 10−4 3.9312 · 10−2
0.025
Yes −0.046185 0.002589 410,782,254 274,877,906,944 1.4944 · 10−3 5.4670 · 10−2
No −0.023894 0.006532 474,586 274,877,906,944 1.7265 · 10−6 1.8582 · 10−3
None
0.05
Yes −0.027305 0.006699 102,036 274,877,906,944 3.7120 · 10−7 8.6163 · 10−4
Table C.17: Results for median-mean on the 2011 South Carolina House map.
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Constraints Results for 2011 South Carolina House Map
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No −0.110594 0.003729 234,239,663,962 274,877,906,946 8.5216 · 10−1 1.3055
Yes −0.113022 0.002914 268,921,439,312 274,877,906,944 9.7833 · 10−1 1.3988
0.05
No −0.063216 0.011717 20,381,767 274,877,906,945 7.4148 · 10−5 1.2178 · 10−2




No −0.109406 0.003946 206,810,105,099 274,877,906,945 7.5237 · 10−1 1.2267
Yes −0.111640 0.002954 267,443,220,613 274,877,906,945 9.7295 · 10−1 1.3950
0.05
No −0.061058 0.011997 12,341,866 274,877,906,944 4.4899 · 10−5 9.4762 · 10−3
Yes −0.068176 0.011708 108,914,955 274,877,906,944 3.9623 · 10−4 2.8151 · 10−2
None
0.025
No −0.103380 0.004228 54,569,991,312 274,877,906,945 1.9852 · 10−1 6.3012 · 10−1
Yes −0.107541 0.003553 164,645,852,935 274,877,906,944 5.9898 · 10−1 1.0945
0.05
No −0.061121 0.012343 22,565,661 274,877,906,944 8.2093 · 10−5 1.2814 · 10−2
Yes −0.072029 0.011406 264,749,031 274,877,906,944 9.6315 · 10−4 4.3890 · 10−2
Table C.18: Results for the bias point estimate on the 2011 South Carolina House map.
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No 10364 0.056450 0.002570 7,032,068,673 43,465,572,353 1.6178 · 10−1 5.6883 · 10−1
Yes 11543 0.057263 0.002697 19,907,535,686 48,410,656,770 4.1122 · 10−1 9.0689 · 10−1
0.05
No 9997 0.041561 0.006603 1,219,518,811 41,926,262,784 2.9087 · 10−2 2.4119 · 10−1




No 10411 0.056162 0.002930 5,497,142,319 43,662,704,641 1.2590 · 10−1 5.0180 · 10−1
Yes 11470 0.056668 0.002122 10,369,182,640 48,104,472,576 2.1556 · 10−1 6.5659 · 10−1
0.05
No 10057 0.040732 0.006511 984,298,586 42,177,921,025 2.3337 · 10−2 2.1604 · 10−1
Yes 11084 0.041660 0.006713 1,430,293,038 46,485,471,232 3.0769 · 10−2 2.4807 · 10−1
None
0.025
No 10062 0.054717 0.003300 4,680,674,634 42,198,892,546 1.1092 · 10−1 4.7100 · 10−1
Yes 11155 0.055408 0.002877 4,366,805,083 46,783,266,816 9.3341 · 10−2 4.3207 · 10−1
0.05
No 8834 0.040460 0.006756 868,841,093 37,048,287,233 2.3452 · 10−2 2.1657 · 10−1
Yes 10109 0.041921 0.006737 1,361,098,391 42,396,024,832 3.2104 · 10−2 2.5339 · 10−1
Table C.19: Results for uniform geometric bias on the 2011 South Carolina House map.
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No 0.042264 0.000593 15,001,972,802 137,438,953,477 1.0915 · 10−1 4.6723 · 10−1
0.025
Yes 0.043094 0.000472 88,487,498,995 137,438,953,472 6.4383 · 10−1 1.1348




Yes 0.029565 0.002590 4,043 137,438,953,472 2.9417 · 10−8 2.4256 · 10−4
No 0.041999 0.000671 8,841,038,490 137,438,953,476 6.4327 · 10−2 3.5868 · 10−1
0.025
Yes 0.042567 0.000281 12,898,140,871 137,438,953,473 9.3846 · 10−2 4.3324 · 10−1




Yes 0.028872 0.002699 5,485 137,438,953,472 3.9909 · 10−8 2.8252 · 10−4
No 0.040770 0.000762 146,131,085 137,438,953,472 1.0632 · 10−3 4.6114 · 10−2
0.025
Yes 0.041517 0.000633 674,218,228 137,438,953,472 4.9056 · 10−3 9.9051 · 10−2
No 0.027291 0.002893 401 137,438,953,472 2.9177 · 10−9 7.6389 · 10−5
None
0.05
Yes 0.029491 0.002704 37,390 137,438,953,472 2.7205 · 10−7 7.3763 · 10−4
Table C.20: Results for variable geometric bias on the 2011 South Carolina House map.
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Appendix D Additional Information
D.1 Markov Chain Runtimes
As mentioned in Chapter 5, one major limitation of the Markov chain outlier analysis ap-
proach to analyze election maps is the runtime required for the algorithm. Even when run on
dedicated nodes on a high-performance computing resource like the Clemson University Palmetto
Cluster, the C++ code used to generate and compare election maps can take a long time to run
to completion. This runtime varies by not only the number of steps, but also the constraint com-
binations chosen, the complexity of the label function, the number of polling precincts in the state,
and the number of election districts for the map in question. A complete summary of runtimes for
different maps, label functions1, and constraints is included in Tables D.1–D.3.
1Where the tables indicate the median-mean measure and bias point estimate as the chosen label functions, note
that two additional measures that were not the primary focus of this analysis were run alongside these as label
functions. Variance (Equation 2.14) was included to compare results against the Pennsylvania analysis by Chikina et
al. [22]. Efficiency gap (Equation 2.12), which is not a measure of partisan bias, was included to investigate a question
unrelated to this thesis. Both measures are similar to median-mean in their computational simplicity.
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240 Steps 238 Steps 240 Steps 238 Steps





No 349:37:40 289:51:52 188:36:42 342:41:43 285:26:10 184:29:49
Yes 242:53:34 186:40:33 116:20:51 216:47:13 204:15:18 139:20:35
0.01
No 339:54:14 290:53:05 186:05:36 335:26:28 281:57:51 184:21:40
Yes 240:53:17 186:50:52 115:31:15 216:43:01 211:01:59 141:03:18
Yes
0.02
No 300:28:13 231:48:46 148:45:12 329:57:57 271:43:00 182:46:20
Yes 208:32:32 156:09:55 98:12:56 190:34:23 175:23:54 121:44:35
0.01
No 302:16:11 230:41:43 147:54:04 322:26:56 273:31:17 185:12:05




No 305:55:30 246:27:35 150:32:44 311:10:27 242:12:50 151:05:53
Yes 239:09:32 192:11:51 116:38:38 214:57:55 179:11:12 111:16:44
0.01
No 307:38:26 245:47:59 151:02:47 312:55:44 245:42:08 151:31:49
Yes 243:38:01 197:14:28 119:05:49 221:59:46 180:07:57 112:17:16
Yes
0.02
No 262:48:23 211:32:10 129:00:38 279:40:31 216:47:14 135:31:48
Yes 193:49:55 159:56:20 97:26:05 185:23:42 155:16:16 96:35:04
0.01
No 263:36:54 209:49:12 129:06:41 282:30:27 215:48:51 133:28:04




No 588:04:45 453:20:01 274:08:40 591:34:38 455:47:15 275:04:42
Yes 401:04:07 308:54:29 187:45:09 288:21:24 227:05:18 139:50:55
0.01
No 593:29:21 454:52:58 278:33:12 587:12:52 452:10:59 279:55:30
Yes 399:43:44 311:20:15 187:57:49 292:49:04 228:12:48 141:00:24
Yes
0.02
No 515:10:52 400:35:05 246:12:52 545:56:49 408:32:34 248:53:46
Yes 344:14:04 260:48:56 159:06:08 249:16:39 192:29:02 119:15:09
0.01
No 531:23:05 402:09:20 247:07:30 535:09:41 410:05:28 250:05:02
Yes 342:31:31 264:28:36 161:29:17 245:27:35 193:03:19 122:03:01











240 Steps 238 Steps





No 178:51:40 74:39:53 61:57:14
Yes 78:01:10 36:02:36 30:13:53
0.01
No 181:39:52 75:31:17 61:09:45
Yes 77:38:42 34:23:57 29:32:23
Yes
0.02
No 51:32:22 20:18:12 17:04:46
Yes 9:56:48 4:00:54 3:21:06
0.01
No 52:18:34 20:11:51 17:09:07




No 167:33:09 70:59:15 56:56:27
Yes 74:02:07 33:47:59 28:48:58
0.01
No 172:47:09 70:16:32 56:49:09
Yes 75:43:19 33:07:06 28:24:40
Yes
0.02
No 49:11:40 21:22:42 16:27:09
Yes 8:35:56 3:23:36 2:52:21
0.01
No 49:45:28 19:39:09 16:27:02




No 383:01:25 163:04:41 130:42:22
Yes 120:41:03 53:11:13 45:14:32
0.01
No 391:35:07 164:11:49 132:01:08
Yes 113:22:25 49:29:25 42:06:35
Yes
0.02
No 227:10:50 91:55:50 75:32:52
Yes 15:39:31 6:21:04 5:15:56
0.01
No 230:40:32 93:04:22 77:22:54
Yes 20:40:05 8:09:37 6:44:41
Table D.2: Runtimes for South Carolina Congressional map.
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No 206:36:31 678:32:09 287:52:56 567:31:29 1410:02:52 979:23:04
Yes 171:11:09 561:52:21 243:01:42 508:18:58 1410:01:43 878:55:27
0.025
No 194:42:16 636:06:58 268:13:03 538:45:22 1410:00:22 969:20:41
Yes 160:24:22 528:48:37 217:05:55 494:19:43 1409:59:23 882:57:10
Perimeter
0.05
No 191:13:14 691:05:39 287:30:51 551:07:30 1406:59:42 990:38:20
Yes 160:35:21 580:44:11 245:32:15 498:37:37 1406:56:32 896:37:29
0.025
No 190:23:09 654:10:19 268:35:08 543:38:56 1406:53:50 974:40:03
Yes 159:05:21 550:54:56 220:03:32 490:00:29 1406:51:07 887:40:32
None
0.05
No 252:05:38 940:22:53 380:50:18 615:39:44 1410:40:04 1124:33:33
Yes 200:51:26 735:40:02 300:08:50 543:07:05 1410:37:52 987:38:27
0.025
No 249:14:50 914:11:16 365:12:00 549:14:20 1410:35:39 1008:58:24
Yes 199:31:08 715:20:09 291:29:50 499:22:46 1410:33:52 913:38:53
Table D.3: Runtimes for South Carolina legislative maps.
∗ The SC House computations for BG,U terminated prior to completion. The Markov chain for this column ran for approximately 235 steps.
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D.2 p-Value Graphs
The long-term behavior of the Markov chain is also mentioned in Chapter 5, with an example
for the South Carolina state House map included in Figure 5.1. For some districtings, such as the
2011 Pennsylvania Congressional plan, the p-value decreases steadily, reaching significance relatively
quickly with respect to the total number of steps taken along the chain and remaining stable,
regardless of which constraints are imposed on the map. Interpreted in context, this means that
the more maps that are generated by the chain, the fewer exhibit bias as extreme as the original
map in question, indicating that the original map is an outlier. For other maps, however, such as
the example in Figure 5.1, this long-term behavior is far less evident. It remains an open question
as to whether certain observable characteristics of the chain allow one to predict the convergence of
the p-value. If so, one could reduce the runtime of the chain by one or several orders of magnitude
without concern over loss of information.
The following figures display the p-value graphed against the number of steps on a semi-
log scale, where the horizontal axis ticks indicate successive powers of two. I include the chain
behavior for all five maps under both median-mean (Equation 2.10) and the variable geometric bias
measure (Equation 2.11 under the VPS assumption), as these are the two label functions identified
in Chapter 4 as reliable indicators of partisan bias for the
√
ε test. The constraints imposed on the
map are indicated above each graph. Note the values on the vertical axis of the graphs. The figures
on the left include the range of all possible p-values that could result from the analysis, allowing
graphs to be compared on the same scale. The right-hand figures show a magnified version of the
same graph to allow the p-value behavior to be observed more closely. On the magnified graphs, the
selected significance level of α = 0.001 is indicated by a dashed red line.
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D.3 Code and Associated Data Files
For those wishing to perform this analysis on election maps from other states or use
this example for instructional purposes, all code utilized in this thesis and the associated data
files for Pennsylvania and South Carolina are available at https://github.com/vagnozzia408/
gerrymandering public. If utilizing the code and data for published work, please include appro-
priate citations as necessary.
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